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In recent years, antidiscrimination theory and doctrine have rested heavily on the
"anticaste" principle first invoked in Strauder v. West Virginia According to this
principle, equal protection law and antidiscrimination statutes should eradicate
public-and private-policies that subject some persons to ongoing stigma and
subordination and therefore to second-class status in society. This Article argues that
while a focus on stigma and subordination is important, it misses a key source of
discrimination-the discrimination that arises from dismissiveness. Antidiscrimination
law has recognized the need to overcome the discrimination that results from invidious
bias, unfair stereotyping, irrationalfear, accumulated myths, or simple neglect. All of
these forms of discrimination reflect situations in which society disfavors people
because of traits or conditions that are unpopular. Yet it is important to recognize as
well that discrimination can-and does-occur when majorities dismiss the impact
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that a person's differences can have and disfavor people because of traits or
conditions that are not unpopular. Indeed, the trait or condition may even be viewed
as desirable by others, even though it is viewed as undesirable by many of those who
have the trait or condition. This Article illustrates discrimination from dismissiveness
with the example of infertility. Infertile men and women suffer from one or another
physical abnormality of their reproductive capacity, and they experience high levels of
psychological distress. By standard measures, infertility is a disability. Yet despite the
level of suffering and the presence of a real bodily dysfunction, many policymakers
and scholars do not treat infertility as a disability. Although infertile persons may be
deprived of the opportunity to procreate, such a deprivation, it is argued, is the loss of
a lifestyle option. Infertile persons still can carry on their lives at work or atplay at
normal levels, with no reduction in functioning. This Article traces the evolution in
views about fertility and reproduction in Western society, and it demonstrates how
changes in perspective about the value of reproduction can turn infertility from an
obvious disability into a condition that may be viewed by many as non-disabling. To
protect the interests ofpersons with infertility and anyone else who might be subject to
discrimination on the basis ofdismissiveness, it is critical to ensure that public policy
recognizes the possibility of discrimination from dismissiveness as it shapes
antidiscrimination theory and doctrine.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, antidiscrimination theory and doctrine have rested heavily on the
"anticaste" principle that the Supreme Court first invoked in Strauder v. West
Virginia.' According to this principle, equal protection law and antidiscrimination
statutes should eradicate public and private policies that subject some persons to
ongoing stigma and subordination, which then relegates them to second-class status in
the courts, political system, schools, workplace, and other public settings. For example,
in explaining why discrimination on the basis of sex is constitutionally suspect, the
Supreme Court pointed to the long and pervasive history of second-class status
experienced by women in society.2 Many legal scholars have argued that the anticaste
principle provides the best understanding of the Equal Protection Clause's meaning.
3
This Article argues that while a focus on stigma and subordination is important, it
misses a key source of discrimination-the discrimination that arises from
dismissiveness. Antidiscrimination law has recognized the need to overcome the
discrimination that results from invidious bias,4 unfair stereotyping,
5 irrational fear,6
1. 100U.S. 303 (1880).
2. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-88 (1973). The Court also cited the
immutable nature of a person's sex and the irrelevance of a person's sex to one's qualifications.
Id. at 686.
3. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 16-21,at 1514-15 (2ded.
1988) ("A more promising theme in equal protection doctrine may well be an antisubjugation
principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced [sic] systems of
subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens."); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2410 (1994).
4. E.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58-59 (1992) (finding unconstitutional a
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accumulated myths,7 or simple neglect.8 Advocates for disfavored groups have also
called for greater protection from discrimination that arises from the attitude that some
individuals (e.g., the obese) have earned their disadvantaged status.9 All of these forms
of discrimination reflect situations in which society disfavors people because of traits
or conditions that are unpopular. Yet it is important to recognize as well that
discrimination can-and does-occur when majorities dismiss the impact that a
person's differences can have and disfavor people because of traits or conditions that
are not unpopular. Indeed, the trait or condition may even be viewed as desirable by
others, even though it is viewed as undesirable by many of those who have the trait or
condition.
To illustrate the problem of discrimination from dismissiveness, I use the examples
of infertility and protection from discrimination on the basis of disability. I argue that
to be complete, antidiscrimination theory must take account of the fact that people with
certain disabilities may experience real and serious suffering, yet others may view their
condition as nondisabling and therefore deny the individuals the medical care or other
services that they need. Infertility is an important case in point. Infertility plagues
millions of couples in the United States, causing high levels of psychological distress,
and driving many men and women to spend thousands of dollars trying to conceive or
adopt a child, either at home or abroad.' 0 Infertile men and women suffer from one or
another physical abnormality of their reproductive capacity. By many measures,
infertility is a disability, as the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to hold in Bragdon v.
Abbott." In Bragdon, the Court held that an HIV-infected woman was protected from
discrimination by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) because her HIV
infection compromised her ability to reproduce.
2
Yet despite the level of suffering and the presence of a real bodily dysfunction,
many policy makers and scholars do not treat infertility as a disability. In their view,
disability involves a diminution in regular, day-to-day functioning, and by that
criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors on the basis of race);
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229-30 (1985) (striking down an Alabama law that limited
voting rights of persons convicted of certain felonies on grounds that the law was motivated by
racial animus); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307-08.
5. E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 549-51 (1996) (rejecting arguments
based on stereotypes about the suitability of military training for women).
6. Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987) (discussing Congress's concern with
discrimination against the disabled because of accumulated myths and irrational fear).
7. Id.
8. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295 (1985) (observing that discrimination against
the disabled often results from benign neglect).
9. E.g., Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler's Despair: The
Portrayal of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television andRadio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 223, 227-30 (2000).
10. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BoNDs: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF PARENTING 1-
23 (1993) (describing her experiences with adoption in Peru); Guido Pennings, Reproductive
Tourism as Moral Pluralism in Motion, 28 J. MED. ETHIcs 337, 338 (2002) (observing that
individuals or couples may travel abroad for fertility treatments because of the high costs in their
home countries).
11. 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
12. Id. at 637-39.
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standard, infertile persons are whole.13 Although infertile persons may be deprived of
the opportunity to procreate, such a deprivation, it is argued, is the loss of a lifestyle
option. 14 Infertile persons still can carry on their lives at work or at play at normal
levels, with no reduction in functioning.' 5
The two very different views on infertility as disability are well-captured in the
majority and dissenting opinions in Bragdon. According to the five-justice majority, an
impairment in the ability to procreate rises to the level of disability because
"[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process
itself.' 16 In the dissenters' view, infertility is not a disability because it does not amount
to an activity, like walking, seeing, breathing, or learning, that is "essential in the day-
to-day existence of a normally functioning individual."'
17
Why such a difference in opinion between the majority and the other justices? This
Article argues that the willingness of the Bragdon dissenters to dismiss the idea that
infertility constitutes a disability reflects both a broad social sentiment that infertility is
not disabling and a less prevalent, but still common, view that infertility may in fact
protect individuals from becoming disabled. Under some important accounts,
parenting is disabling in its effects on a person's place in society. As Germaine Greer
has written, "modem society is unique in that it is profoundly hostile to children....
Mothers who are deeply involved in exploring and developing infant intelligence and
personality.., share the infant's ostracized status."' 8 The possibility that infertility
may protect from disability is reflected in the fact that many people choose to become
infertile,' 9 whether temporarily with birth control pills or other means of contraception,
or permanently with a tubal ligation or vasectomy.
20
This Article traces the evolution in views about fertility and reproduction in
Western society, and it demonstrates how changes in perspective about the value of
13. See, e.g., Shorge Sato, Note, A Little Bit Disabled: Infertility and the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 189,200 (2001) (observing that "infertility is
not a disability in the same sense as the loss of a limb or a degenerative disease.... [and] poses
no threat to the patient's physical health").
14. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102, 106 (S.D. Iowa 1995);
Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing Coverage Exclusions as
Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 338-40 (2005) (discussing and criticizing the argument
that reproduction is a lifestyle option).
15. Wendy Kaminer, Reproductive Entitlement, AM. PROSPECT, Mar. 27, 2000, at 14, 14
(quoting infertile woman who noted that she could "do mostly everything--run, jump, skip");
Sato, supra note 13, at 200 (pointing out that infertility "does not directly affect the participation
of men or women in the economy or in public life").
16. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638.
17. Id. at 660.
18. GERMAINE GREER, SEX AND DESTINY: THE POLITICS OF HUMAN FERTILITY 2-3 (1984).
19. See DONALD EVANS, VALUES IN MEDICINE: WHATARE WE REALLY DOING TO PATIENTS?
89 (2008) (observing that for some people, infertility is a blessing).
20. In a tubal ligation, both of a woman's fallopian tubes are blocked, preventing eggs from
reaching the uterus from the ovaries. Herbert B. Peterson, Sterilization, 111 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 189, 190-98 (2008). In a vasectomy, both of a man's vas deferens are blocked,
preventing sperm from reaching the urethra from the testes. Lisa Memmel & Melissa Gilliam,
Contraception, in DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 567,582 (Ronald S. Gibbs et al.
eds., 10th ed. 2008).
[Vol. 85:143
DISCRIMINATION OUT OF DISMISSIVENESS
reproduction can turn infertility from an obvious disability into a condition that may be
viewed by many as nondisabling. To protect the interests of persons with infertility and
anyone else who might be subject to discrimination on the basis of dismissiveness, it is
critical to ensure that public policy recognizes the possibility of discrimination from
dismissiveness as antidiscrimination theory and doctrine are shaped.
Part I of this Article discusses the anticaste principle's prominence in equality
theory; Part II considers the failure of the anticaste principle to reach discrimination on
the basis of infertility; and Part III demonstrates the weak protection that
antidiscrimination law provides to persons suffering from infertility. This Article
concludes with a recognition of the need for antidiscrimination theory and doctrine to
take account of discrimination on the basis of dismissiveness.
21
I. THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE'S PROMINENCE IN EQUALITY THEORY
As legal scholars have analyzed Supreme Court doctrine, constitutional history, and
moral theory, they have come to emphasize the "anticaste" role of the Equal Protection
Clause and antidiscrimination statutes. In this view, a key justification for the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law lies in the desire
to maintain a truly egalitarian society, one that is free of classes of persons who are
relegated by government to both pervasive social disadvantage and a second-class level
of citizenship.22 Similarly, antidiscrimination statutes like the Civil Rights Act of 1964
or the ADA are designed to prevent private parties from imposing second-class
citizenship on different minorities.
A. The Anticaste Principle in Legal Scholarship
The anticaste principle is widely emphasized in legal scholarship. Drawing on
fundamental tenets of our Constitution, the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and essential moral precepts, legal scholars have found the anticaste
principle to provide an important way to understand the Constitution's requirement of
equal protection.
Some scholars have derived the anticaste principle by focusing on what it means to
require equality among citizens. Charles Black observed, for example, that although
21. Discrimination from dismissiveness has some similarities to, but is different than, what I
would characterize as discrimination out of denial. As an example of the latter, consider claims
that affirmative action is no longer needed because racial discrimination no longer exists.
Individuals taking that position would not be dismissing the seriousness of racial discrimination;
rather, they would be denying the existence of racial discrimination.
22. While the anticaste principle is very important, it does not exhaust the meaning of equal
protection. See Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2412. Consider, in this regard, Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (per curiam). In that case, the Supreme Court found a violation of
equal protection when a zoning board treated a homeowner less favorably than it treated other
homeowners with respect to her request to be connected to the municipal water supply. Id. at
564-65. There was no suggestion that the woman had suffered discrimination on other
occasions or that she was part of a class of persons that suffered persistent discrimination. Id.
Rather, the Court applied the Equal Protection Clause in the setting of a single act of
discrimination against a single person. Id.
2010]
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the full meaning of the Equal Protection Clause is not obvious, it is quite clear that
equality does not exist when "a whole race of people finds itself confined within a
system which is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an inferior
station." 23 Similarly, Kenneth Karst found the anticaste principle to be implicit in the
concept of equality.24 As he wrote, "[t]he essence of equal citizenship is the dignity of
full membership in the society." 25 To ensure full membership, the principle ofequality
must "presumptively forbid[] ... society to treat an individual either as a member of an
inferior or dependent caste or as a nonparticipant. Accordingly, the principle guards
against degradation or the imposition of stigma."
26
Other scholars have looked to the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. Owen Fiss
identified an anticaste principle in the Equal Protection Clause by starting with the
important reality that while the Fourteenth Amendment recognizes rights for all
persons, the primary intent of the Amendment was to safeguard the rights of blacks.27
And indeed, courts have provided blacks with the highest degree of protection under
the Equal Protection Clause.28 Fiss argued that in further understanding the meaning of
the Equal Protection Clause, it is essential to recognize that what is distinctive about
blacks as a class is their history of severe subjugation and political powerlessness and
the long-standing duration of that subjugation.29 In other words, the Equal Protection
Clause is quintessentially directed at both protecting the interests of groups that are
specially disadvantaged in society and preventing the implementation of laws or
practices that aggravate or perpetuate a specially disadvantaged group's subordinate
position in society.
30
In his constitutional law treatise, Laurence Tribe also emphasizes the history of the
Fourteenth Amendment in favoring an anticaste principle as an explanatory theme for
the Equal Protection Clause. 31 That is, the Equal Protection Clause represents "an
antisubjugation principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally
reinforced systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens."
32
Equal protection does not permit society to treat some of its members as "outsiders or
23. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,
424 (1960); see also Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term: Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8-12 (1976) (discussing the role of the
antidiscrimination principle in protecting against stigmatic harm).
24. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term: Forword: Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (1977).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 6; see also Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 248
(1983). Some scholars distinguish between the imposition of stigma and the creation of a caste-
like system. See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY
57-61, 83-84 (1996). As the Sunstein excerpt indicates, however, the two concerns are closely
intertwined, and any differences are not material for purposes of this Article. Sunstein, supra
note 3, at 2430-31 (discussing the linkage between a caste-like system and stigma).
27. Fiss, supra note 3, at 147.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 150.
30. Id. at 155-57.
31. TRmE, supra note 3, § 16-21, at 1516.
32. Id. § 16-21, at 1515.
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as though they were worth less than others. 3 3 Tribe points out that the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were drafted specifically with the goal of
overturning the holding from Dred Scott that blacks were not citizens but rather
constituted an inferior class subject to subjugation.34 In the words of the Dred Scott
Court,
We think [blacks] are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to
be included, under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and can therefore claim
none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary, they were at that time considered as
a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet remained subject to their
authority, and had no rights or privileges but such as those who held the power
and the Government might choose to grant them.
35
Cass Sunstein traces the anticaste principle not only to the history of the Fourteenth
Amendment but also to the original framing of the Constitution.36 He sees the principle
as "captur[ing] an understanding that has strong roots in American legal traditions...
and fits well with the best understandings of liberty., 37 As Sunstein points out, the
anticaste principle grows out of the Constitution's original rejection of the legacy of
monarchy,38 made explicit in the Constitution's ban on titles of nobility,39 in favor of a
government that is constituted from the people and elected by the people.
40
The legislative debate over the Fourteenth Amendment also reflects the importance
of the anticaste principle. Sunstein recounts the testimony of Senator Jacob Howard of
Michigan, who brought the proposal for the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate floor
from committee. 41 According to Howard, the Fourteenth Amendment "abolishes all
class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste
of persons to a code not applicable to another.""2 In his mention of "class legislation"
and a "code not applicable to another," everyone understood that Senator Howard was
referring to concerns with the "Black Codes" that Southern States had quickly enacted
following the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment's ban on slavery.43 These Codes
denied basic civil rights to the newly freed slaves and maintained their legal and social
subjugation. 44
33. Id.
34. Id. § 16-21, at 1516.
35. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1857).
36. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2412.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2428-29.
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; see also id. § 10, cl. 1.
40. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2428-29.
41. Id. at 2435; see also David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CI. L. REv.
383, 404 (2008).
42. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 2435 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766
(1866)).
43. Id.
44. GEOFFREY R. STONE, Louis M. SEIDMAN, CAss R. SuNSTEiN, MARK V. TUSHNET &
PAMELA S. KARLAN, CONSTrruTIoNAL LAW 458-59 (5th ed. 2005).
2010]
INDIANA LA WJOURNAL
B. The Anticaste Principle in Case Law
The anticaste principle has ample support from legal scholars not only because it
fits closely with the principle of equality and the motivations behind the adoption of
the Equal Protection Clause; it also finds strong support from language in leading
Supreme Court decisions, dating as far back as the Court's first case interpreting the
Fourteenth Amendment's application to claims of discrimination on the basis of race.
Strauder v. West Virginia45 involved a challenge to a state law disqualifying blacks
from eligibility to serve on juries.46 A unanimous Court struck down the
disqualification, writing that the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection to blacks
"from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society . . . and [those]
discriminations which are steps towards reducing [blacks] to the condition of a subject
race.A 7 Less than two decades later, Justice John Harlan sounded a similar theme when
he delivered his classic understanding of the Equal Protection Clause in objecting to a
Louisiana law that required railroad companies to maintain segregated passenger cars
for their customers:
[Tihere is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful.
48
More recent examples from Supreme Court doctrine reinforce the anticaste
principle of equal protection jurisprudence. In Brown v. Board of Education,49 the
Court found "separate but equal" public school education unconstitutional because it
"generates a feeling of inferiority as to [children's] status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
50
The Court's opinion in Plyler v. Doe5' is similarly illustrative. In Plyler, the Court
considered whether Texas could deny a free education in the public schools to children
whose families were lawful citizens of other countries and did not have legal status in
the United States.52 In concluding that the Equal Protection Clause required Texas to
give the children access to its schools, the Court wrote that "[l]egislation imposing
special disabilities upon groups disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their
control suggests the kind of 'class or caste' treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment
was designed to abolish.,
5 3
The anticaste principle also played a key role in shaping the Court's recognition that
discrimination on the basis of sex generally cannot survive constitutional scrutiny. In
45. 100U.S. 303 (1880).
46. Id. at 304.
47. Id. at 308.
48. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. Id. at 494.
51. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
52. Id. at 205.
53. Id. at 217 n.14.
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the important case of Frontiero v. Richardson,54 the Court highlighted the anticaste
principle in striking down the military's differential treatment of male and female
soldiers when it came to housing and medical benefits for spouses. 55 According to the
Court, discriminations on the basis of sex deserve heightened scrutiny because of this
country's "long and unfortunate history" of discrimination that "in practical effect, put
women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage." 56 The Court also expressed its concern with
"statutory distinctions... [that] often have the effect of invidiously relegating the
entire class of females to inferior legal status."
57
Romer v. Evans58 provides another important illustration of the critical role that the
anticaste principle plays in equal protection case law. In Romer, the Court struck down
an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that would have denied individuals
protection from discrimination on the basis oftheir sexual orientation.59 The Court was
especially troubled by the fact that the amendment called for a "sweeping and
comprehensive" diminution in the legal status of homosexuals.60
In short, the Supreme Court has consistently placed great weight on the anticaste
principle as it has shaped its equal protection jurisprudence in key cases, whether
involving discrimination against blacks, women, homosexuals, or undocumented alien
children.
C. The Anticaste Principle and Disability Law
Just as the anticaste principle runs through theories and doctrine that address
discrimination on the basis of race or sex, so does it drive theories and doctrine with
respect to discrimination on the basis of disability. Indeed, the legislative history of the
ADA emphasizes the need to overcome the second-class status that persons with
disabilities endure. According to the congressional findings, for example, "studies have
documented that people with disabilities, as a group, occupy an inferior status in our
society.",6 1 Congress also found that "individuals with disabilities are a discrete and
insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness in our society." 62 The unequal treatment of the disabled reflects a
54. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
55. Id. at 688-91.
56. Id. at 684.
57. Id. at 686-87.
58. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59. Id. at 626-36.
60. Id. at 627, 632.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6) (2006). Compared to other persons, individuals with
disabilities have lower levels of education, employment, and family income, and higher rates of
incarceration. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability, " 86 VA. L. REv.
397, 420-22 (2000) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability].
Surprisingly, the ADA has not increased the likelihood that persons with disabilities will be
employed. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 19-23
(2004).
62. § 12101(a)(7).
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number of sources, including invidious bias,63 inaccurate stereotypes, 64 irrational
fears,65 aesthetic and existential anxiety,66 and simple neglect.67
A number of scholars have developed a minority-group model of disability to
illuminate the nature of disability and the discriminatory treatment that persons with
disabilities face.68 According to the minority-group model, individuals with disabilities
have been relegated to second-class status because of exclusionary social practices and
structures that are shaped by public policy and that turn various physical features into
disabling conditions.69 In other words, there are two important components to the
minority-group model: disabilities are not inherent in the person's physical condition,
but are socially constructed, 70 and the social construction of disability can be traced to
public policies that antidiscrimination law should address.
71
The importance of the anticaste principle in the development of disability
discrimination law has led one prominent scholar to argue that the ADA should provide
protection when-and only when-individuals with a disability form a subordinated
class of persons. According to Samuel Bagenstos, the Act's definition of disability
should encompass individuals only when they are stigmatized and constitute an
identifiable group of people who face systematic disadvantage in society because of the
public's prejudice, stereotyping, or neglect.72
63. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273,279 (1987).
64. See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, supra note 61, at 423-24.
Sometimes persons with disabilities suffer unequal treatment out of misplaced concern that
certain activities would be harmful to them. Michael A. Rebell, Structural Discrimination and
the Rights of the Disabled, 74 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1437 (1986).
65. Arline, 480 U.S. at 284 (referring to discriminatory treatment of persons with
noninfectious diseases like epilepsy or cancer "based on the irrational fear that they might be
contagious").
66. Harlan Hahn, Antidiscrimination Laws and Social Research on Disability: The Minority
Group Perspective, 14 BEUAV. SCI. & L. 41, 54 (1996) (describing aesthetic anxiety as a "deep
sense of discomfort" from persons with physically unappealing characteristics and existential
anxiety as reflecting "unconscious fears about the prospect of becoming disabled").
67. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 295-96 (1985).
68. Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 659-65
(1999) (describing the development of the minority-group model); Michelle Fine & Adrienne
Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma: Social Interaction, Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. Soc.
IssUEs 3 (1988) (same).
69. Crossley, supra note 68, at 659.
70. Id. In a society that relied on spiral ramps rather than angular steps to connect different
floors of buildings, Anita Silvers writes, moving around in a wheelchair would be much less
challenging. Similarly, more reliance on recordings and less on printed text to convey
information would make blindness much less handicapping. Anita Silvers, Formal Justice, in
ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN & MARY B. MAHOwALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE,
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 13, 74 (1998).
71. Crossley, supra note 68, at 659; Hahn, supra note 66, at 53; see also MICHAEL OLIVER,
UNDERSTANDING DISABILITY: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 32-33 (1996); Silvers, supra note 70,
at 39-76; David Orentlicher, Deconstructing Disability: Rationing of Health Care and Unfair
Discrimination Against the Sick, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 49, 66-71 (1996); Richard K.
Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 213, 214-17 (2000).
72. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, supra note 61, at 418-45.
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In sum, the anticaste principle has played a dominant role in theory, case law, and
legislative history for the Equal Protection Clause and antidiscrimination statutes like
the ADA. As such, it has provided a strong basis for striking down policies that impose
second-class status on different minorities. 73 However, as discussed in the next two
Parts, the anticaste principle does not account for groups, like the infertile, that
experience discrimination out of dismissiveness.
II. THE ANTICASTE PRINCIPLE'S FAILURE TO PROTECT INFERTILE PERSONS
As a historical matter, in the United States infertility has often-but not always-
constituted a disability that conferred disfavored status in society. In recent years,
however, with the evolution of socioeconomic conditions that have made procreation
less desired, infertility has become less stigmatized, and even seen by some as
conferring protection from the disabling consequences of parenthood.74 Accordingly,
the anticaste principle has become less effective in protecting the interests of infertile
persons.
A. Infertility
Infertility is defined as occurring when a couple engages in unprotected intercourse
for one year without being able to conceive a child and it is estimated to affect ten to
fifteen percent of couples in the United States. 75 Although it is commonly thought that
environmental factors or high-risk behaviors increase the likelihood of infertility, this is
not the case.76 Rather, there is greater awareness of the condition and therefore a
greater likelihood that couples will seek treatment for their inability to reproduce and
will therefore be diagnosed as infertile.77 In addition, a person's chances ofbecoming a
parent decline after age twenty-five. Men and women at age twenty-five have twice the
likelihood of conceiving a child in a particular month as do men and women at age
73. Although powerful, the anticaste principle has not always been followed in this country.
E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding the conviction of two adult males
who engaged in consensual sex), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (upholding "separate but equal" facilities for blacks
and whites) overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. In other countries, infertility still results in a disfavored status. See Tara M. Cousineau
& Alice D. Domar, Psychological Impact of Infertility, 21 BEST PRAC. & RES. CLncAL
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 293, 296 (2007); S.J. Dyer, N. Abrahams, M. Hoffman & Z.M. van
der Spuy, 'Men Leave Me as I Cannot Have Children': Women's Experiences with Involuntary
Childlessness, 17 HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1663 (2002) (documenting the effect serious of
infertility on social status of women in South Africa); Karen Springen, Infertility: What It
Means to Be a Woman, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 2008, www.newsweek.com /id/158625/page/l
(describing ostracism of infertile women in developing countries).
75. Kristin P. Wright & Julia V. Johnson, Infertility, in DANFORTH'S OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY, supra note 20, at 705, 705.
76. Id. For example, data does not support the claim that environmental or other factors
have caused a decline in sperm counts worldwide. Harry Fisch, Declining Worldwide Sperm
Counts: Disproving a Myth, 35 UROLOGIC CLINICS N. AM. 137 (2008).
77. Wright & Johnson, supra note 75, at 705.
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thirty-five.78 Thus, as many couples have postponed efforts to have children until their
thirties or forties, their likelihood of becoming pregnant has become less than if they
tried to have children in their twenties.
79
Infertility can result from a number of different abnormalities in the male or female
reproductive system. For example, because of sexually transmitted diseases,
chemotherapy, mumps during adolescence, testicular injury, or other causes, a man
may produce low levels of sperm or the sperm may be dysfunctional.8 0 Women may
have trouble ovulating, or their fallopian tubes may be scarred from infection,
preventing the passage of eggs from the ovaries to the uterus.8' Women who have had a
ruptured appendix, abdominal surgery, or pelvic surgery also may become infertile.
8 2
Moreover, endometriosis (uterine cells growing outside the uterus) can interfere with
the function of ovaries or fallopian tubes. And, in many cases, the cause of infertility is
unknown. 3
A number of treatments are available for infertility. For women whose fertility is
blocked by fallopian tube dysfunction, for example, in vitro fertilization (lVF) is often
successful. With IVF, doctors retrieve eggs from a woman's ovary after hormonal
stimulation of the ovaries, fertilize the eggs with sperm in a petri dish, and transfer
some of the embryos to the woman's uterusY4 The remaining embryos are frozen for
future use.8 5 Male infertility can be overcome much more easily today than in past
decades. In particular, with the development of intracytoplasmic sperm injection
(ICSI), in which a doctor injects a single sperm into each of the woman's eggs that
have been retrieved as part of IVF, men who produce even very low levels of
functioning sperm can procreate with their partners.86 Overall, treatment allows eighty-
five percent of infertile couples to have a child. 7
The emotional impact of infertility can be severe, particularly for women. Reported
symptoms of infertility include feelings of grief, sadness, and despair; a sense of panic,
helplessness, and isolation; and a loss of control.88 As the Supreme Court has
78. Adam H. Balen & Anthony J. Rutherford, Management of Infertility, 335 BRrr. MED. J.
608, 608 (2007).
79. Wright & Johnson, supra note 75, at 705.
80. Id. at 706.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. BradleyJ. Van Voorhis, In Vitro Fertilization, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 379,380 (2007).
85. Id.
86. Hubert Joris & Gianpiero Palermo, Pregnancy After Intracytoplasmic Injection of
Single Spermatozoon into an Oocyte, 340 LANCET 17 (1992). There are some concerns,
however, that ICSI may raise the risks of abnormalities in the child. Sacha Lewis & Hillary
Klonoff-Cohen, What Factors Affect Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection Outcomes, 60
OBsTETRIcAL AND GYNECOLOGICAL SURVEY 111, 111 (2005). Other methods of assisted
reproduction present important risks to the couple or the children that result. See generally
Michelle Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1657, 1723-36 (2008).
87. OBSTETJCS AND GYNECOLOGY 385 (Charles R.B. Beckmann et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006).
88. Linda D. Applegarth, The Psychological Aspects of Infertility, in INFERTILrY:
EVALUATION AND TREATMENT 25, 27 (William R. Keye, Jr. et al. eds., 1995); Sara L. Berga,
Barbara L. Parry & Jill M. Cyranowski, Psychiatry and Reproductive Medicine, in 2 KAPLAN &
SADOCK'S COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PsYCHIATRY 2293, 2300 (Benjamin J. Sadock &
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recognized, procreation constitutes a fundamental interest.89 Indeed, for many people,
having and raising children is the most important endeavor of their lives. For people
who want to reproduce, but cannot, the loss can be devastating.90 In one study, nearly
half of the women in an infertility treatment program reported that their infertility was
the most upsetting experience of their lives. 91 In another study, participants were asked
to rate their most stressful experiences, and infertility rated as high as the death of a
spouse or child.92 In a third study, researchers found that the likelihood of depression
doubled for women with infertility.93 According to a fourth study, infertile women
suffer levels of depression comparable to those of women with cancer, HIV, or those
who were undergoing rehabilitation after a heart attack. 94 And when infertility is a
consequence of cancer or its treatment, some cancer survivors describe the loss of
fertility as causing as much emotional pain as the cancer itself.95 As one woman who
Virginia A. Sadock eds., 8th ed. 2005); ALINE P. ZOLDBROD, MEN, WOMEN, AND INFERTILITY 3
(1993); Cousineau & Domar, supra note 74, at 295-96; see also Lynn White & Julia
McQuillan, No Longer Intending: The Relationship Between Relinquished Fertility Intentions
and Distress, 68 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 478,487 (2006) (finding that "individuals who relinquish
their intentions to have (more) children report more increases in depressive symptoms than those
who continue to feel confident about their childbearing intentions").
89. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
90. Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 623,
629-30 (1991); Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers,
Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 30 (2008); Katherine T. Pratt,
Inconceivable? Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELLL. REv. 1121, 1126-30
(2004).
91. Ellen W. Freeman, Andrea S. Boxer, Karl Rickels, Richard Tureck & Luigi
Mastroianni, Jr., Psychological Evaluation and Support in a Program of In Vitro Fertilization
and Embryo Transfer, 43 FERTILITY AND STERILITY 48, 50 (1985). Fewer men described their
infertility as the most upsetting experience of their lives-fifteen percent overall. Id. While the
studies find high levels of distress among women regardless of the cause of the infertility, men
appear to experience comparable levels of distress only when their infertility is the cause of the
couple's infertility. Robert D. Nachtigall, Jeanne M. Tschann, Seline Szkupinski Quiroga, Linda
Pitcher & Gay Beckeret, Stigma, Disclosure, and Family Functioning Among Parents of
Children Conceived Through Donor Insemination, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 83, 87-88 (1997).
Because studies of the psychological impact of infertility typically involve couples who seek
treatment, they may find higher levels of distress than they would in a random sample of
infertile couples. Linda H. Bums & Sharon N. Covington, Psychology of Infertility, in
INFERTILITY COUNSELING: A COMPREHENSIvE HANDBOOK FOR CLINICIANs 3,7 (Linda H. Bums et
al. eds., 1999).
92. Mimi Meyers, Ronny Diamond, David Kezur, Constance Scharf, Margot Weinshel &
Douglas S. Rait, An Infertility Primer for Family Therapists: Medical, Social, and
Psychological Dimensions, 34 FAM. PROCESS 219, 223 (1995).
93. Alice D. Domar, Alexis Broome, Patricia C. Zuttermeister, Machelle Seibel & Richard
Friedman, The Prevalence and Predictability ofDepression in Infertile Women, 58 FERTILITY &
STmLrrY 1158, 1160-61 (1992).
94. Alice D. Domar, Patricia C. Zuttermeister & Richard Friedman, The Psychological
Impact of Infertility: A Comparison with Patients with Other Medical Conditions, J.
PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY, Special Issue 1993, at 45, 47-49.
95. Carrie L. Nieman, Karen E. Kinahan, Susan E. Yount, Sarah K. Rosenbloom, Kathleen
J. Yost, Elizabeth A. Hahn, Timothy Volpe, Kimberly J. Dilley, Laurie Zoloth & Teresa K.
Woodruff, Fertility Preservation andAdolescent Cancer Patients: Lessons from Adult Survivors
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had been diagnosed with Hodgkin's Lymphoma said, "When I was first diagnosed with
cancer, my friends couldn't believe how well I took the news. But the one fear that
continued to haunt me was the thought that I might become infertile." 96
B. Infertility is a Disability
Does infertility constitute a disability? Given the nature and impact of infertility, it
readily satisfies the definition of a disability.
"Disability" refers to the existence of substantial limitations on a person's "major
life activities. 97 Major life activities include "walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working."98 Commonly, disability is caused by an impairment,
which is defined as a "physical or mental anomaly." 99 A person with the impairment of
paralyzed legs is disabled with respect to the major life activity of walking. A person
with the impairment of advanced emphysema may be disabled with respect to the
major life activities of walking, breathing, or working.
One also can be disabled without being impaired. If someone has a history of a
serious illness that has been fully treated, other people might regard the person as being
impaired and therefore limit the person's opportunities at work or in other settings.
100
This example of a disability without impairment illustrates the social contribution to
disability, a contribution that exists as well with respect to disabilities caused by
impairment. If one is confined to a wheelchair, one is much less disabled in an
environment that has ramps and elevators than in a world that only has steps to connect
different heights.
Just as a person can be disabled without being impaired, one can be impaired
without being disabled. A kidney donor has the impairment of having one kidney
instead of two, but there are no functional limitations as a result of the impairment.'1
0
Note too that while illness and impairment overlap, they are not the same. One can be
ill with cancer and be disabled as a result. One also can be disabled from an
impairment without being ill.'0 2 For instance, someone who loses an arm or a leg in an
accident is impaired but not ill.
Infertile persons generally meet the definition of a disability because they have an
impairment of their reproductive tracts (e.g., scarred fallopian tubes) that substantially
limits the major life activity of procreation. Having children is an interest of
fundamental importance to many people; for many people, it is the most important
endeavor they undertake in their lives. Thus, as mentioned, the Supreme Court has
of Childhood Cancer and Their Parents, in CANCER TREATMENT & RESEARCH: ONCOFERTILITY:
FERTILITY PRESERVATION FOR CANCER SURVIVORS 201,201 (Steven T. Rosen et al. eds., 2007).
96. Fertile Hope, Personal Accounts of Cancer and Infertility, in CANCER TREATMENT &
RESEARCH, supra note 95, at 243.
97. ANITA SILVERS, DAVID WASSERMAN & MARY MAHowALD, DISABILITY, DIFFERENCE,
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN BIOETHICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 8-9 (1998).
98. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3j)(2)(ii) (2009).
99. SILVERS ET AL., supra note 97, at 9.
100. Id.
101. See Hassan N. Ibrahim, Robert Foley, LiPing Tan, Tyson Rogers, Robert F. Bailey,
Hongfei Guo, Cynthia R. Gross & Arthur J. Matas, Long-Term Consequences of Kidney
Donation, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 459, 459 (2009).
102. OLIVER, supra note 71, at 33-37.
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recognized it as a fundamental right.103 Indeed, it would be odd to identify working at a
job as a major life activity but not similarly recognize bearing and raising children as a
major life activity. Because of the central role that reproduction plays in the lives of so
many individuals, the Supreme Court has held that reproduction is a major life
activity.' °4
To be sure, some would argue that infertility is an inevitable result of aging and
therefore represents a natural state, not a disabling condition. This argument ignores
the fact that many infertile persons are of normal childbearing age but have lost their
reproductive capacity through illness or injury.10 5 Moreover, many well-recognized
disabilities are a common result of aging,'0 6 including hearing loss 10 7 and
osteoporosis.s If we are willing to provide hearing aids for the hearing-impaired and
hip replacements for seniors with reduced bone density to overcome their disabilities,
we also should be willing to provide treatments for infertility to overcome that
disability.
C. Evolution of Social Views on Infertility
In colonial America, infertility was a serious burden for an affected woman, and it
could subject her to suspicion in her community. 10 9 Indeed, in New England, among
women accused of being witches, there was a disproportionate representation of
women with no or few children.10
But the social structure of the family offered opportunities for the infertile to
overcome their neighbors' suspicions. Households were not based solely on the nuclear
family; rather, it was common for couples to take in related children who had lost one
or both parents"' or unrelated children as apprentices to learn a trade and help out with
103. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) ("We are dealing here with legislation
which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to
the very existence and survival of the race.").
104. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) ("Reproduction falls well within the
phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to
the life process itself.").
105. See generally Wright & Johnson, supra note 75, at 705-06 (discussing the main causes
of infertility and their approximate frequencies in both male and females).
106. Jack M. Guralnik, Linda P. Fried & Marcel E. Salive, Disability as a Public Health
Outcome in the Aging Population, 17 ANN. REv. PuB. HEALTH 25, 32 (1996).
107. Lisa Fook & Rosemary Morgan, Hearing Impairment in Older People: A Review, 76
POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 537, 537 (2000).
108. See generally U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., BONE
HEALTH AND OSTEOPOROSIS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 69 (2004), available at http://
www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/bonehealth/docs/full report.pdf (discussing the frequency of
bone disease, which is highly prevalent in the elderly, and its role as a common cause of
debilitating fractures in the elderly).
109. ELAINE TYLER MAY, BARREN IN THE PROMISED LAND: CHILDLEsS AMERICANS AND THE
PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 26-29 (1995).
110. Id. at28.
111. See MARGARET MARSH & WANDA RONNER, THE EMPTY CRADLE: INFERTILITY IN
AMERICA FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 17-18 (1996). Children commonly lost one or
both of their parents before the age of adulthood during colonial times. Id. at 18. In one county,
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the demands of rural life." 2 Children might be indentured for long periods to
employers or "rented out" in exchange for wages." 13 Parents with many children-more
than they wanted or could afford-might send them to live with childless couples." 4 In
addition, child raising was a communal responsibility, with adults participating in the
rearing and disciplining of children living in other homes. 1' Thus, even though
infertile couples could not have their own children, they did take in unrelated
apprentices and children from related families, as well as participate in the rearing and
disciplining of all children. "6 In short, the public and communal nature of child rearing
meant that infertile couples were able to experience much of the social role of
parents." 1
7
The status of infertile couples began to change toward the end of the eighteenth
century as families took on more of a private, nuclear nature. 18 At this time, the center
of economic activity moved away from the household, with men working outside the
home in the commercial centers and women working in the homes." 19 As the economic
role of the household decreased, the home became a place for marital fulfillment and
for cultivation of the next generation of citizens.' 20 A belief developed that children
needed more attention both because of their future roles in society and because oftheir
place in the family's circle of love and intimacy.' 21 And as immigration and
urbanization created a more diverse population, reformers discouraged the earlier
practices by which children flowed easily from one household to another., 22 By the
twenty percent of children by the age of thirteen had lost both parents. Id. If a mother died,
leaving young children, and the father did not remarry quickly, he often would send the children
to live with relatives. Id. Widows too might send children to live with relatives. See id. In fact,
John Hancock, who signed the Declaration of Independence, was brought up from the age of
eight by an aunt and uncle after his father died. Id.
112. Seeid. at 19.
113. BARBARA BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 63-65 (2008).
114. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 11, at 18-19. The latter part of the nineteenth century
through the early years of the twentieth century saw a somewhat similar practice of "placing
out" children from poor families. MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN
AMERICA 1, 4 (1992). Thousands of children were moved from their urban homes to rural
homes, where childless couples wanted a family, homemakers wanted help around the house, or
farmers and merchants wanted workers. Id. at 2-3, 119. The children might come from asylums
for orphans or indigent children, prisons, the streets, or parents who hoped for a better life for
their children. Id. at 24, 47-48.
115. See MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 18-19.
116. Id.; see also ELIZABETH C. BRITr, CONCEIVING NORMALCY: RHETORIC, LAW, AND THE
DOUBLE BINDS OF INFERTILTY 20 (2001); MAY, supra note 109, at 30-31.
117. BRIrT, supra note 116, at 20; MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 18-19; MAY, supra
note 109, at 30-31. See generally MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 17-19 (1993) (describing the overlap of family and community in colonial America).
118. E.g., MARSH& RONNER, supra note 111, at 19.
119. BRIrr, supra note 116, at 20-21; SUSAN HOUSEHOLDER VAN HORN, WOMEN, WORK,
AND FERTILITY, 1900-1986, at 4 (1988); see also REGAN, supra note 117, at 19.
120. See BRITr, supra note 116, at 21.
121. MAY, supra note 109, at 36-40; STEVENMINTZ, HUCK'sRAFr: AHISTORYOFAMERICAN
CHILDHOOD 78 (2004).
122. MAY, supra note 109, at 40; see also WOODHOUSE, supra note 113, at 241-43
(describing the chasm between middle-class Americans and the children of poor immigrants).
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middle of the nineteenth century, households had lost most of their public function,
with the ideal family constituting a married couple and their offspring,' 23 and a
glorification of motherhood suggested that having children was the sole reason for a
woman's existence. 24 In this view, the home was portrayed as the central institution of
American life, and the mother became the linchpin of social unity.
125
This did not mean that fertility rates were high. Indeed, they declined throughout the
nineteenth century as economic changes made children's labor less necessary for the
family's economic security and also demanded more investment in children to prepare
them for the new workforce with its more complex trades and professions.1 26 This shift
was reinforced by the child's new place in the family. 127 Altogether, it made sense to
have fewer children and spend more per child on education and other activities. 28
Also, women developed interests in activities beyond their domestic responsibilities,
including working for pay in the marketplace.
29
Still, even though a suffrage movement was active and social roles were being
rethought, a "culture of matrimony" had developed by the early part of the twentieth
century, with a norm for women of marriage and childbearing.' 30 Women who did not
123. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 10-11; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 148 (1992); JAMIL ZAINALDIN, LAW IN ANTEBELLUM SOCIETY 70
(1983). Historians cite a number of reasons for the shift from the communal to the private
household. In addition to economic changes, scholars point to the diminished sense of
obligation to authority of Revolutionary democracy and the individualism of evangelistic
religion. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 11, at 19; WOOD, supra at 145-48. The informal
practices of children flowing from one household to another were replaced with formal laws of
adoption. MAY, supra note 109, at 40.
124. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 3 1.
125. Id. at 32. Interestingly, single women could find a respected social role "by providing
maternal functions in the civic arena." MAY, supra note 109, at 49. See generally Martha
Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows ": Toward a History of Family Law,
1985 Wis. L. REv. 819, 877-82 (1985) (providing an overview of women's involvement in these
civic roles).
126. MINTZ, supra note 121, at 77-78; WOODHOUSE, supra note 113, at 243.
127. MARSH& RONNER, supra note I 11, at 98. Fertility rates declined more rapidly in cities,
while remaining higher in rural areas where land was cheaper and children had greater economic
value. VAN HORN, supra note 119, at 15-17. With fertility rates beginning their decline by the
beginning of the nineteenth century and declining more rapidly in the nineteenth century than in
the twentieth century, id. at 2, the availability of birth control pills and the recognition of a
constitutional right to contraception turn out to be minor factors in the story.
128. Naomi Cahn & June Carbone, Red Families v. Blue Families 9-11 (George Washington
Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 343, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-102589. Parents were devoting more attention and
resources to their children also because attitudes toward children were becoming more
enlightened. HOLT, supra note 114, at 11-13; MINTz, supra note 121, at 77-78.
129. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 11, at 75; VAN HORN, supra note 119, at 2.
130. VAN HORN, supra note 119, at 19-20; see also MAY, supra note 109, at 69 (observing
that a woman's "most exalted role in life was motherhood"). There were ethnic and racial
elements to the concerns about infertility. Birth rates may have been declining for white
families, MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 113, but the overall birth rates remained higher
among black women and immigrants, MAY, supra note 109, at 75. Fears about "race suicide"
were common. MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 113. At this time, the eugenics movement
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meet this norm were considered abnormal, and a man who was childless faced
suspicions that he had infected his wife with a sexually transmitted disease.1
3 1
With the economic turmoil of the Great Depression, voluntary childlessness peaked
in the United States, and fertility rates dropped to their lowest levels. 132 With World
War II and the revival of the American economy, the "Baby Boom" ensued, and
fertility rates in the mid-1950s rose again to levels last seen in 1898.133 Much of the
increase in birth rates reflected pent-up demand from the Depression' 34 and World War
II, 135 and so turned out to be a temporary interruption of a long-term decline in fertility
rates. Also contributing to the increase in fertility rates was a period of unusual
economic prosperity for families. Because of low birth rates during the Depression,
fewer young adults were entering the labor market, driving up wages. 36 And because
of the GI Bill's funding of higher education, these young adults came into the labor
market able to take on better-paying jobs. 37 During this period, parenthood was
celebrated, and childless couples were marginalized and stigmatized.
31
During the 1960s and 1970s, childbearing became less valued by society.13 9 While
it is difficult to be confident about the exact causes of the decline in valuation, the
decline appears to represent more of a resumption of long-term trends than short-term
phenomena.140 Experts cite a number of social changes that came together.
For example, the women's movement pushed for greater equality between the sexes
and a reconsideration of traditional gender roles.14 1 As women experienced greater
opportunities in the workplace, many found their professional work more rewarding
than rearing children. Many women delayed marriage and procreation, 142 and when
they did have children, they spaced them farther apart. 143 Many women also shortened
the duration of their years of procreation. 44 This has resulted in fewer children per
woman and fewer women having children.14
5
became influential. MAY, supra note 109, at 63-64 (describing the efforts of some eugenicists).
See generally Lori B. Andrews, Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on Genetic Enthusiasm,
27 SETON HALL L. REv. 893, 893-97 (1997) (discussing the development and rise in popularity
of eugenics in America).
131. BRiTr, supra note 116, at 24-25; MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 123; MAY,
supra note 109, at 63.
132. MARSH&RONNER, supranote 11, at 154.
133. Herbert S. Klein, The U.S. Baby Bust in Historical Perspective, in THE BABY BUST:
WHO WILL Do THE WORK? WHO WILL PAY THE TAXES? 113, 129 (Fred R. Harris ed., 2006).
134. Economic constraints discouraged procreation at this time. Id. at 122.
135. The mobilization of the military diverted large numbers of young males away from
marriage and procreation. Id.
136. VAN HORN,supra note 119, at 112-13.
137. Klein, supra note 133, at 126-27. The federal government's subsidization of home
mortgage credit also made housing cheaper, lowering the costs of parenting. Id. at 127.
138. MAY, supra note 109, at 139. Voluntary childlessness was especially stigmatized. See
id. Male infertility was also singled out for disfavor, as social myths connected fertility with
virility. Id. at 159.
139. See Klein, supra note 133, at 129, 132.
140. Id. at 129-45.
141. Id. at 134.
142. See Van Voorhis, supra note 84, at 379.
143. Klein, supra note 133, at 143.
144. Id. (observing that women not only delayed the beginning of their childbearing years
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In addition, the entry of women into the workplace continued to build upon long-
term changes that had altered the economics of procreation, with the cost-benefit ratio
of children continuing to become less favorable. 146 As women could earn more outside
the home, the opportunity costs of raising children rose substantially. Costs increased
further as children needed to remain in the home longer for a suitable education and for
the development of skills necessary to compete in the increasingly complex
marketplace, 147 Costs also rose as the pursuit of higher education became more
common. At the same time that costs were increasing, the economic benefits of
children continued to decrease. In our agrarian past, children played an important role
as farm workers. With fewer and fewer families living on farms and farms becoming
heavily mechanized, rural children had less to offer in terms of family finances. Urban
children also had little to offer economically; their earning potential was limited by
child labor laws.14
8
The economics of procreation changed in other important ways. As infant and child
mortality rates declined and life expectancy increased, 49 parents recognized that they
needed to have fewer children to ensure that one or two would live long enough to
provide financial support when the parents no longer could support themselves. 50
but also ended their childbearing at younger ages).
145. Id.; Van Voorhis, supra note 84, at 379. Among U.S. women age forty to forty-four in
2006, twenty percent had no children. That number is double the percentage of childless women
age forty to forty-four in 1976. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: 2006, at 4 (2008), available at http://www.
census.gov/population/socdemo/fertility/cps2006/SupFertTab2.xls.
Female participation in the workplace is an important, but not complete answer to declining
fertility rates. Fertility rates in Italy are among the lowest in Europe even though the
employment rate for women is relatively low. Fiona McAllister & Lynda Clarke, Voluntary
Childlessness: Trends and Implications, in INFERTILITY IN THE MODERN WORLD 189, 217
(Gillian R. Bentley & C.G. Nicholas Mascie-Taylor eds., 2000). Apparently, because gender
roles are much more traditional in Italy than other parts of Europe, and women bear a much
larger share of household responsibilities, Italian women are less inclined to have additional
children than their counterparts in European countries, where men assume a larger share of
household responsibilities. Melinda Mills, Letizia Mencarini, Maria Leitizia Tanturri & Katia
Begall, Gender Equity and Fertility Intentions in Italy and the Netherlands, 18 DEMOGRAPHIC
RESEARCH 1 (2008), available at http://www.demographic-research.org/volumes/vol 18/1/18-
I.pdf. The availability of childcare and the flexibility of workplace hours also can influence the
willingness of working women to procreate. Ronald R. Rindfuss, Karen Benjamin Guzzo & S.
Philip Morgan, The Changing Institutional Context of Low Fertility, 22 POPULATION RES. &
POL'Y REV. 411,416-17 (2003).
146. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 93-112 (1981).
147. WOODHOUSE, supra note 113, at 243.
148. HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 20 (1988).
149. Between 1900 and 1960, life expectancy in the United States increased from a little
over forty-seven years to nearly seventy years. NAT'L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2007, at 175 tbl.27 (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus07.pdf; see also MAY, supra note 109, at 25 (discussing
the connection between high infant mortality rates and high fertility rates in colonial America).
150. In the late eighteenth century, a couple might have twelve children, with only three
reaching adulthood. See MARSH & RONNER, supra note 111, at 11 (describing the Holyoke
family's experience in Massachusetts).
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Accordingly, as had already started to happen in the nineteenth century, the economics
of childrearing favored fewer children. The economics of childrearing also favored
higher per-child investments, which would increase the likelihood that children would
enjoy increased prosperity and be able to support their parents.15' The implementation
of Social Security further diminished the need to rely on reproduction for security in
older age. I5 2 Also, declining mortality rates led to reductions in fertility as increases in
the population put pressure on land and other resources.
53
Other social changes have played a role in the declining fertility rate. During the
1960s and 1970s, the youth of the time challenged traditional social institutions
including the family.' 54 Sociologists have described a process of "reflexive
modernization": As individuals have realized greater freedom to construct their own
identities rather than have their identities shaped by social norms, 55 they have changed
the nature of family roles. Many couples voluntarily choose to be childless, believing
that the ideal intimate relationship involves another adult, unencumbered by
children. 156 Also, reflexive modernization brings with it risk aversion-if people can
construct their own identities, they bear more responsibility for outcomes. 57 Hence,
couples are more likely to be cautious about making major commitments. This has led
to an increase in cohabitation before marriage and a rise in the average age at marriage
(so that individuals can be surer that they have chosen the right spouse); it also has led
to delays in procreation.'58 As divorce has become more acceptable and more common,
becoming a parent has also become a riskier endeavor, 1 9 and people may find that
there are diminished benefits from investing time and energy in raising a family rather
than cultivating a professional career.16
0
The risk aversion of reflexive modernization has been increased by the "new
capitalism." As free-market ideology spread in the 1980s and 1990s, labor markets
became more fluid-the days of life-long employment and company-provided pension
plans have been replaced by job mobility and self-directed retirement accounts. The
new capitalism has meant greater potential for gain but also greater potential for
failure.' 61 An important way to hedge against the risks of the new capitalism is to invest
more in education and work experience and less in family formation and expansion.162
151. BECKER, supranote 146, at 111.
152. Population Reference Bureau, Social Security Systems Around the World, TODAY'S
RESEARCH ON AGING, Jan. 2009, at 1, 3, available at http://www.prb.org/pdfD9/TodaysResearch
Aging 1 5.pdf. The development of private pension plans has probably contributed as well to the
decline in fertility rates.
153. Klein, supra note 133, at 116.
154. BRrrr, supra note 116, at 27.
155. Peter McDonald, Low Fertility and the State: The Efficacy ofPolicy, 32 PoPuLATiON &
DEV. REv. 485, 488 (2006).
156. BRrrr, supra note 116, at 27.
157. McDonald, supra note 155, at 489.
158. Id.
159. Rindfuss et al., supra note 145, at 414.
160. ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 27-38 (1992).
161. See McDonald, supra note 155, at 491.
162. Id. at 490-94. The new capitalism can also promote procreation. If greater job mobility
makes it easier to leave and reenter the workforce, then women may be more willing to interrupt
their careers to have children. See Hans-Peter Kohler, Francesco C. Billari & Jos6 A. Ortega,
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Concern about global overpopulation also may have contributed to the declining
desire for procreation. In 1968, Paul Ehrlich published The Population Bomb,163 a best
seller that sounded the alarm about overpopulation, and in 1972, the Club of Rome
issued The Limits to Growth,164 a best-selling book that predicts the collapse of the
world's social and economic systems because of unsustainable growth in the
population. A number of advocates mounted aggressive environmental arguments
against procreation, asserting that the survival of the planet Earth required dramatic
reductions in population growth. 16 5 Current concerns about global warming could
reinforce environmental arguments against procreation.166 Higher-density housing uses
less energy, but higher-density housing is less conducive to raising a family.'
67
With all of these changes in social attitude, more and more couples have chosen to
forego procreation. In England and Wales, for example, women born in 1972 are
expected to end their reproductive years with a childless rate twice that ofwomen born
in 1942.168 Similarly, a forty- to forty-four-year-old woman in the United States was
twice as likely to be childless in 2006 than was a forty- to forty-four-year-old woman in
1976.69
Declining fertility rates in the United States and other Western countries also are
striking indicators of changing views on reproduction. In the United States, the total
fertility rate hovers around the replacement rate of 2.1,170 while in other Western
countries, women do not have enough children to maintain their nation's population
levels. In Italy, for example, the fertility rate is 1.3, and in the Netherlands, Sweden,
Low Fertility in Europe: Causes, Implications and Policy Options, in THE BABY BUST, supra
note 133, at 48, 92-93. Also, those for whom the new capitalism results in greater family wealth
are in a better position to afford more children. BEN J. WAITENBERG, FEWER: How THE NEW
DEMOGRAPHY OF DEPOPULATION WELL SHAPE OUR FUTURE 64-65 (2004).
163. PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB (1968).
164. DONELLA H. MEADOWS, DENNIS L. MEADOWS, JORGEN RANDERS & WILLIAM W.
BEHRENS III, THE LIMrrs TO GROWTH (1972) (describing the work of the Club of Rome).
165. See JAMES REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PUBLIC VIRTUE 373 (1978). Interestingly, one
study of limited-income women suggests that people felt more strongly that population growth
was a serious problem than took the view that married couples had a responsibility to limit their
procreation because of overpopulation. Larry D. Barnett, U.S. Population Growth as an
Abstractly-Perceived Problem, 7 DEMOGRAPHY 53, 53 (1970).
Views may be changing about world population. As fertility rates have declined, a number of
experts have warned about the threat from underpopulation. See, e.g., WATrENBERG, supra note
162, at 23-27 ("Today... every modem nation ... is below the 2.1 replacement level.");
Russell Shorto, No Babies?, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008, (Magazine) at 36 (discussing very low
fertility rates in Europe).
166. See, e.g., Paul A. Murtaugh & Michael C. Schlax, Reproduction and the Carbon
Legacies ofIndividuals, 19 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 14, 18 (2009) (calling for a consideration
of a person's reproductive choices in calculating that person's impact on the global
environment).
167. David Owen, Green Manhattan, NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2004, at 111.
168. See McAllister & Clarke, supra note 145, at 192 tbl.6.1.
169. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 145.
170. The total fertility rate refers to the number of children per woman throughout her life,
and the replacement rate refers to the number of children required per woman to maintain a
country's population at a steady level. Fertility rates are also measured in terms of children per
1,000 women in a specific year. For example, the baby boom fertility rate peaked in 1957 at
122.9 births per 1,000 women. VAN HORN, supra note 119, at 85.
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and the United Kingdom, it is close to 1.7. 171 Within countries, fertility rates vary
among women of different race, educational attainment, and state of residence. For
example, in the United States, women who did not graduate high school have a fertility
rate fifty percent higher than women with a graduate degree.
72
As fertility rates have dropped, voluntary sterilization rates have risen. In the United
States, voluntary surgical sterilization was rarely employed before the 1960s.' 73 Indeed,
states commonly restricted sterilization for contraceptive purposes. 74 Since then,
sterilization has become the most common form of birth control, with thirty-six percent
of couples relying on that method. 75 Three-fourths of these couples choose tubal
ligation for the woman, and one-fourth of these couples choose vasectomy for the
man.
176
As fertility rates dropped, perceptions about infertility changed. By the 1970s,
attitudes about infertility were shifting.177 Instead ofeliciting a sympathetic response to
their plight, a childless couple might be told that pregnancy was unattractive, that the
world was already overpopulated, or that their friends wished they had infertility
problems. 178 The infertile also would face similar sentiments in the media. In 1970, the
widely read weekly magazine, Look, published an article, Motherhood: Who Needs It,
in which Betty Rollin suggested that children made marriages worse, that women
should place greater emphasis on seeking happiness from the development of their own
selves, and that God today would say, "Be fruitful. Don't multiply."'79 Antichild
sentiments of the time led Michael Novak to write, "Choosing to have a family used to
be uninteresting. It is, today, an act of intelligence and courage."'
Is
While parenthood became more valued in the 1980s,181 it is no longer the case that
the role of women revolves around a strict norm of parenting, nor is it the case that
women suffer from stigma by virtue of their childlessness. To be sure, couples still
commonly value parenting, and it is a high priority for them. Nevertheless, social
171. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE CIA WORLD FACTBOOK 2008, at 414, 556, 608
(2007). Israel's total fertility rate is slightly higher than India or Egypt at 2.77. Id. at 179, 270,
290; Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli & Martha Dirnfeld, In Vitro Fertilisation Policy in Israel and
Women's Perspectives: The More the Better?, 16 REPROD. HEALTH MATrERs 182, 183 (2008).
172. U.S. CENsus BUREAU, supra note 145. Also, the fertility rates in more politically
conservative states tend to be higher than fertility rates in more liberal states. Cahn & Carbone,
supra note 128, at 26.
173. ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 59 (1995).
174. Id. at66-67.
175. Deborah Bartz & James A. Greenberg, Sterilization in the United States, 1 REv.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 23, 24 (2008). Almost thirty-one percent of couples rely on the
woman taking oral contraceptive pills for their birth control. Id.
176. Id.
177. MARSH&RONNER, supra note 11, at211.
178. Id. at211-16.
179. Betty Rollin, Motherhood: Who Needs It?, LOOK, Sept. 22, 1970, at 15, 17.
180. Michael Novak, The Family Out of Favor: The Courage to Marry and Raise Children
Presupposes a Willingness (Presently Unfashionable) to Grow Up, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1976,
at 37, 37.
181. Bnrrr, supra note 116, at 27. In fact, babies became stars in popular movies like Three
Men and a Baby and Look Who's Talking. MAY, supra note 109, at 214.
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attitudes about infertility have changed to the point that rather than being viewed as a
seriously abnormal condition, a condition that elicits disfavor and second-class status,
infertility is now often seen as a nondisabling condition, and people therefore dismiss
the idea that infertility entails a disability. 8 2 The next section elaborates on this point.
D. Contemporary Public Views on Infertility
There is much evidence for the view that people generally do not see infertility as
really disabling in the way emphysema, rheumatoid arthritis, paraplegia, or blindness is
seen as disabling; rather fertile persons frequently dismiss the idea that infertility is a
significant problem.
1. Infertility Is Not Seen as Disabling
Perhaps the most important evidence comes from leading studies of infertile couples
by university-based researchers. In her study of infertility, for example, Elizabeth Britt
found that "the infertile often feel as if the seriousness of their condition is
trivialized."' 8 3 Disclosure of their infertility might elicit "jokes about the couple not
knowing how to have sex or about the fun the couple must be having trying to conceive
a child."' s4 Other people "might suggest that infertility is a blessing in disguise" or that
it is not as bad as other medical conditions because reproduction "supposedly is so
optional."'' 8 5 Or they might say something like, "Oh well, so what, so you don't have to
have a baby, so what, just adopt."' 8 6
Similarly, Arthur Greil found from his interviews with infertile couples that they
criticized fertile people for "treating the plight of the infertile as if trivial and
inconsequential."187 The infertile also were troubled that fertile individuals "acted as if
... infertility were a small and relatively easy problem to solve."' 188 As one woman
reported, her friends might say, "'Why don't you go on a cruise?' Or 'Why don't you
just relax? And then you'll get pregnant."" 89 According to Greil, infertile couples do
182. See Tanya Koropeckyj-Cox, Victor Romano & Amanda Moras, Through the Lenses of
Gender, Race, and Class: Students' Perceptions of Childless/Childfree Individuals and
Couples, 56 SEx ROLES 415 (2007) (documenting increasingly favorable views of the infertile
among college students); cf KAREY HARWOOD, THE INFERTILrrY TREADMILL 102-03 (2007)
(discussing changes in social views that reduced the importance of parenting in living a full
life).
183. BrrT, supra note 116, at4l.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. ARTHUR L. GREIL, NOT YET PREGNANT: INFERTILE COUPLES iN CoNTEMPORARY AMERICA
128 (1991).
188. Id. at 129.
189. Id. at 130; see also HARWOOD, supra note 182, at 54 (noting that many infertile persons
are told to "[just relax, you'll get pregnant"). The "just relax" advice is consistent not only with
a dismissive view of infertility but also a stigmatizing view of infertility. Charlene E. Miall,
Community Constructs of Involuntary Childlessness, 31 CANADIAN REv. Soc. &
ANTmoPoLoGY 392,405-07 (1994) (studying infertility in Canada). Undoubtedly, perceptions
of the infertile encompass a range of views, including both dismissiveness and stigma.
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not feel like they are viewed as inferior because of their infertility. 9 ° Rather, the
discrimination they feel arises out of a "failure of others to acknowledge the
seriousness of infertility.' 191 In one typical remark, an infertile person observed, "I
think [fertile people] discriminate by making light of the problem."'192
Discussion of relevant constitutional and tax law principles by legal scholars also
indicates that infertility is not seen as a real disability. In the constitutional context,
Carl Coleman and Radhika Rao have considered whether a ban on access to IVF or
other infertility treatments would violate an infertile couple's constitutional right to
procreate. 193 Both of them quickly dismiss the interests of infertile couples in
constitutional protection and conclude that restrictions on access to infertility
treatments would be constitutionally valid. 194 It is difficult to imagine that they would
conclude so readily that restrictions on access to wheelchairs or hearing aids would
survive a constitutional challenge.'
95
In the tax context, scholars have debated the question whether expenses for IVF and
other fertility treatments are deductible as medical expenses. In her analysis of the
issue, Katherine Pratt describes an exchange among tax specialists on a law professors'
Listserv.' 96 One leading expert argued against the deductibility of fertility treatment
costs on the ground that reproductive dysfunction does "not involve the sort of
catastrophic losses that justify a medical expense deduction."' 197 Of course, this
argument ignored the fact that the costs of prescription drugs for diabetes and high
blood pressure are deductible' 98 even though there is no catastrophic loss involved.
Another leading expert also rejected the deductibility of fertility treatment costs on the
ground that the treatments do not constitute health care; rather, in his view,
reproduction is an optional activity, a lifestyle choice. 199
This is an unusual way to speak about the exercise of a fundamental right. One
ordinarily would not describe voting as a lifestyle choice. But it is a classic way for
people to dismiss the claims for recognition of other fundamental rights, as when some
characterize homosexuality as a "lifestyle choice."
200
Nevertheless, the weight of evidence indicates that dismissiveness plays a very important role in
the response of others to infertility, particularly when compared to earlier periods in history.
190. GREIL, supra note 187, at 132.
191. Id.; see also Constance N. Scharf & Margot Weinshel, Infertility and Late-Life
Pregnancies, in COUPLES ON THE FAULT LINE: NEW DIRECTIONS FORTHERAPISTS 104, 108 (Peggy
Papp ed., 2000) (observing that the infertile "couple's experience is usually little understood and
not valued by their family and friends" (citation omitted)).
192. GREIL, supra note 187, at 128.
193. Carl H. Coleman, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Constitution, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 57 (2002); Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: AssistedReproductive Technology
and Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1457 (2008).
194. Coleman, supra note 193, at 68-70; Rao, supra note 193, at 1478-80. Although
Coleman and Rao give very short shrift to the interests of the infertile, their arguments have
some merit and are worth considering in more depth. For that discussion, see Part III.C.
195. I am grateful to Alicia Ouellette for this point.
196. Pratt, supra note 90, at 1124-25.
197. Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 1140-41.
199. Id. at 1124. Ironically, the same expert argued that expenses for treatment of sexual
dysfunction (e.g., the costs of Viagra) might qualify for a tax deduction. Id. at 1125.
200. See, e.g., Mable Jackson, Homosexuality Is a Lifestyle Choice, CENT. MIcH. LIFE, Nov.
[Vol. 85:143
DISCRIMINATION OUT OF DISMISSIVENESS
A third important source of evidence for the view that infertility is not seen as a
disability comes from the policies of health-care insurers. As a general and long-
standing practice, health-care plans do not cover the costs of IVF and similar
procedures to help infertile couples have children.20 1 According to a recent estimate,
fewer than twenty percent of large U.S. employers (those with 500 or more employees)
202provide coverage for IVF. Among employers with fewer than 500 employees, only
twenty-five percent offer any infertility services, and they typically exclude coverage
for IVF or other assisted reproductive technologies. 20 3 The health insurance plan of this
Article's author through Indiana University is typical. It is an Anthem preferred-
provider plan,204 and while its coverage is generally quite good (no in-network
deductible, the same coverage for mental health problems and substance abuse as for
heart disease, cancer, or other illnesses, and a $2,000 cap on annual out-of-pocket in-
network expenses), it does not cover artificial insemination, IVF, infertility drugs, or
any procedures or testing related to fertilization. 20 5 Another Indiana University
preferred-provider plan (with a $900 in-network deductible and a $2,400 annual cap on
out-of-pocket, in-network expenses) has the same coverage exclusions for infertility
treatment.2 °6
Surprisingly, coverage for abortion is much more common than coverage for
infertility treatments. In a survey ofprivate health insurance plans in Washington State,
researchers found that only two percent of enrollees were covered for infertility
services while forty-seven percent of female enrollees were covered for elective
207
abortion. Moreover, none of the plans that covered infertility services included
coverage for IVF or other assisted reproductive technologies. The percentage of plans
offering abortion coverage was even higher-sixty-seven percent or more, depending
on the type of plan (e.g., HMO, PPO, etc.). 20 8 And coverage for reversible
contraception exceeds coverage for abortion.
20 9
7, 2005, at 7A, available at media.www.cm-life.com/media/storage/paper906/news/2005/11/07/
Voices/Homosexuality.Is.A.Lifestyle.Choice-2499936.shtml.
201. See Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 1215, 1215-18 (1997).
202. Joseph C. Isaacs, Infertility Coverage Is Good Business, 89 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1049, 1049 (2008).
203. Id. Other assisted reproductive technologies include artificial insemination, ICSI, and
gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT). See supra note 226; infra note 86.
204. Under a preferred-provider plan, the insurer identifies physicians, hospitals and other
health-care providers as "preferred" and requires higher payments when their customers seek
care from a nonpreferred provider. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID
ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHIcs 1335 (7th ed. 2007).
205. INDIANA UNIVERSITY, BLUE PREFERRED PRIMARY POS-BENEFIT SUMMARY (2009),
available at http://www.indiana.edu/-uhrs/pubs/books/POS-SummaryO9.pdf.
206. INDIANA UNIVERSITY, PPO $900 DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH CARE PLAN-BENEFIT SUMMARY,
(2009), available at http://www.indiana.edu/-uhrs/pubs/books/PPO900-Summary09.pdf.
207. Ann Kurth, Kris Graap, John Conniff& Frederick A. Connell, Reproductive and Sexual
Health Benefits in Private Health Insurance Plans in Washington State, 33 FAM. PLAN. PERSP.
153, 157 tbl.3 (2001).
208. Id. at 156 tbl.2.
209. A national study found that eighty-nine percent of plans provide coverage. Adam
Sonfield, Rachel Benson Gold, Jennifer J. Frost & Jacqueline E. Darroch, U.S. Insurance
Coverage of Contraceptives and the Impact of Contraceptive Coverage Mandates, 2002, 36
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It also is useful to compare coverage of infertility treatments with coverage for
medical equipment, like wheelchairs, and medical devices, like prosthetic limbs. Some
commentators question whether it makes sense to view IVF and other methods of
assisted reproduction as medical treatments since they bypass rather than correct the
causes of infertility.210 IVF may help an infertile couple have a child, but it does not
address the reasons for the infertility. Similarly, a wheelchair bypasses the reasons for a
person's inability to walk. According to this argument, insurance coverage should be
available for treatments like antibiotics that eliminate the underlying problem but not
for treatments that leave the underlying cause alone. While there are a number of
211problems with this argument, it turns out that coverage for infertility pales even
when compared with coverage for medical equipment or devices that compensate for a
disability like paraplegia or amputation without correcting the underlying cause of the
disability. In one study, for example, less than seven percent of children who were
privately insured lacked access to mobility aids or devices or to hearing aids or hearing
care.212 The author's own insurance plan is typical. Although it provides no coverage
for IVF or other infertility treatments, it covers eighty percent of the costs of medical
equipment and devices.21 3 Once a person's out-of-pocket spending for all medical
treatment reaches $2,000 for the year, the plan picks up 100% of the costs of medical
equipment and devices.214
Advocates for infertility treatment coverage have had some success in getting
legislation passed to support their cause.215 Twelve states mandate insurance coverage
for infertility treatments,21 6 and two states require that coverage be offered.217 However,
even when legislation exists, it may be limited. California and New York expressly
exclude IVF from the mandate to cover or offer coverage,2 1 8 and Arkansas allows
PERSP. ON SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH 72, 72 (2004).
210. THE N.Y. STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 96 (1998).
211. As others have responded, many medical treatments restore lost function without
correcting the underlying problem, as when insulin is prescribed for diabetes. Id.
212. Stacey C. Dusing, Asheley Cockrell Skinner & Michelle L. Mayer, Unmet Needfor
Therapy Services, Assistive Devices, and Related Services: Data from the National Survey of
Children with Special Health Care Needs, 4 AMBULATORY PEDIATRICS 448, 451 tbl.2 (2004).
Even for children on Medicaid, the unmet needs were low. Somewhat more than twelve percent
of Medicaid recipients lacked access to mobility aids or devices, and less than nine percent
lacked access to hearing aids or hearing care. Id.
213. INDIANA UNlvERsIrY, supra note 205.
214. Id.
215. BRrTr,supra note 116, at 1-2 (observing that state laws were proposed and lobbied for
by RESOLVE, a support and advocacy group for infertility treatments; RESOLVE's website is
www.resolve.org). For a recent discussion of state mandates, see Jessica L. Hawkins, Note,
Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 203, 204 (2007).
216. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for
Infertility Treatment (May 2009), http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm.
217. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFrEY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6
(West 2005); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.001-.007 (Vernon 2009).
218. CAL. HEALTH & SAFrEY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); CAL. INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West
2005);N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (13), 3221 (6) and 4303 (McKinney 2006).
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insurers to cap lifetime benefits for IVF at $15,000. 2 19 Moreover, the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state insurance mandates
like those for infertility coverage when an employer self-insures for employee health-
220
care insurance.
The limited success of efforts to pass legislative mandates for infertility coverage
stands in contrast to other efforts to pass insurance coverage mandates. It is common to
find state law requirements for private insurers to provide coverage when people want
to evade parenting (i.e., contraceptive legislation). And Congress has twice passed
legislation to require coverage for mental health treatment that is comparable to
221
coverage for treatment of physical illnesses like cancer or heart disease.
Public health plans are no different. Consider, for example, the Oregon Health Plan
("Oregon Plan"). The Oregon Plan represented a major effort to provide health care to
all Oregon residents. Under the Plan, the state's Medicaid program would eliminate
coverage for care when the marginal benefits of the care could not justify its costs and
use the savings to ensure that all persons had insurance.222 In other words, instead of
providing Cadillac care to some indigent people, Oregon hoped to provide Chevrolet
care to all of its poor.223 To implement its Plan, Oregon ranked medical treatments in
terms of their benefits and costs and drew a line between covered treatments and
uncovered treatments based on the amount of funding available.22 4 For example, the
May 2002 ranking included 736 different treatments, and the cut-off for coverage fell
such that all treatments ranked 566 or higher were covered.225 Notably, Oregon chose
not to cover treatment for infertility even while it covered treatments to block
procreation. In the May 2002 ranking, for example, the Plan covered contraception to
prevent pregnancy temporarily, sterilization to prevent it permanently, or abortion to
terminate a pregnancy. 226 For infertile Oregonians who wanted to have children,
however, the Plan did not cover treatments to help them reproduce. Among the
uncovered treatments were surgery on a woman's fallopian tubes to restore fertility,
artificial insemination, IVF, and gamete intra-fallopian transfer (GIFT).227 Medicaid
219. 054-00-001 ARK. CODE R. § 6 (Weil 2008).
220. See Timothy S. Jost & Mark A. Hall, The Role of State Regulation in Consumer-Driven
Health Care, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 395, 398 (2005).
221. See infra Part III. D.
222. Jonathan Oberlander, Health Reform Interrupted: The Unraveling of the Oregon Health
Plan, 26 HEALTH AFT. 96, 97 (2007), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/reprint/
26/l/w96.
223. Id. at 97. The Plan never realized its goal. At its height, the Plan reduced the number of
uninsured by one-third. Id. at 97. However, within a decade of its implementation, Oregon had
the same percentage of uninsured residents that it had before the Plan was adopted. Id. at 99.
224. Id. at 97.
225. OR. HEALTH SERVS. COMM'N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES (May 1, 2002),
available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR/HSC/docs/PList5-02.pdf.
226. Id.
227. Id. With JVF, a fertility specialist combines a woman's egg and a man's sperm in the
laboratory to create an embryo. Van Voorhis, supra note 84, at 380. After a couple of days, the
embryo is inserted into the woman's uterus. See id. GIFT is much like IVF except the fertility
specialist places the embryo into the woman's fallopian tube. See Ricardo H. Asch, Linda R.
Ellsworth, Jose P. Balrnaceda & Peng C. Wong, Pregnancy After Translaparoscopic Gamaete
Intrafallopian Transfer, 324 LANCET 1034, 1034 (1984); see also M. Ranieri, V.A. Beckett, S.
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programs in other states typically exclude coverage for IVF and other infertility
treatments as well.
228
In short, from a number of perspectives-public attitudes toward infertile couples,
views of constitutional and tax law experts, and policies of health-care insurance
plans-infertility is no longer seen as a disabling condition in the United States.
2. Infertility May Even Be Seen as Enabling
In the view of many people, the infertile person is better off than the fertile person.
Having children, it is said, places one at a disadvantage when it comes to opportunities
for a fulfilling life, in the professional world or particularly with one's partner. In
Elaine Tyler May's study of childless persons in the United States, she recounts a
number of representative comments. According to one voluntarily childless woman,
she and her husband chose not to have children because they "like the freedom.,
229
And she prefers to call herself "childfree" rather than "childless" because childfree
suggests the absence of something undesirable. 230 Another woman said that she and her
husband did not care to have children interfere in their relationship. 231 A man reported
that he "simply did not want the troubles and commitment associated with raising
children., 232 While some voluntarily childless couples explain their decision in terms
of a desire to devote more time to careers or civic endeavors, it is far more common for
the voluntarily childless to talk about their preference for a "private life without
children over a private life with children., 233 A private life without children allows
them more time with their partner for "love, intimacy, and enjoyable pursuits.' 234
In a British study, common reasons given by persons who were certain that they did
not want children include the increased and permanent responsibility that parenthood
entails, the sacrifice of spontaneity and freedom that goes along with the increased
Marchant, A. Kinis & P. Serhal, Gamete Intra-Fallopian Transfer or In-Vitro Fertilization After
Failed Ovarian Stimulation and Intrauterine Insemination in Unexplained Infertility?, 10 HUM.
REPROD. 2023, 2023-25 (1995) (comparing GIFT to IVF).
228. Elena N. Cohen, Reproduction and Reproductive Genetics, in 5 TREATISE ON HEALTH
CARE LAW § 22.04, at 22-74 (2008); NAT'L. HEALTH LAW PROGRAM & NAT'L. ASS'N. OF CMTY.
HEALTH CTRS., ROLE OF STATE LAW IN LIMITING MEDICAID CHANGES 1, 24-48 (2007),
http://www.healthlaw.org/library/item. 100796.
229. MAY, supranote 109, at 181.
230. Id. at 181-82.
231. Id. at 196.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 185.
234. Id. at 208. Some studies have found that marital happiness is greater both before the
arrival of the first child and after the last child leaves for college. Peggy L. Dalgas-Pelish, The
Impact of the First Child on Marital Happiness, 18 J. ADVANCED NURSING 437 (1993) (finding
greater marital happiness in childless couples than in couples with a first pregnancy or first
child); Sara M. Gorchoff, Oliver P. John & Ravenna Helson, Contextualizing Change in Marital
Satisfaction During Middle Age: An 18-Year Longitudinal Study, 19 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
1194 (2008) (finding increased marital satisfaction for married women when they became
"empty nesters"); see also S. Mark Pancer, Michael Pratt, Bruce Hunsberger & Margo Gallant,
Thinking Ahead: Complexity of Expectations and the Transition to Parenthood, 68 J.
PERSONALITY 253,257 (2000) (discussing studies that find a decline in marital satisfaction with
reproduction, but not for all couples).
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responsibility, and the greater opportunities for self-fulfillment without children. 235
Representative comments from that study include a man citing the advantages of a freer
schedule and the time that he could spend enjoying his wife's company. 236 A woman
spoke of the independence she enjoyed and the freedom from the constraints of
parenthood.237
There are many social practices that reflect a less than enthusiastic view of children
in society. Consider this excerpt from Sex and Destiny:
At the heart of our insistence upon the child's parasitic role in the family lurks the
conviction that children must be banished from adult society.... The heinousness
of taking an infant or a toddler to an adult social gathering is practically
unimaginable .... Restaurants, cinemas, offices, supermarkets, even Harrods
auction rooms, are all no places for children. In England, restaurants mentioned in
The Good Food Guide boldly advise parents to "leave under-fourteens and dogs at
home" ....
... There is so little interpenetration between the worlds of the child and the adult
that we can easily call to mind whole districts of our inner cities where no child is
ever seen .. 238
The contrast with child-friendly cultures is striking. While children often are not
welcome to attend weddings in the United States-the adults-only wedding is a
common event-children are front and center at weddings in Orthodox Jewish
communities and typically included in invitation lists throughout Israel.
23 9
Scholarship on reproductive issues reflects the increasingly prevalent sense that a
life without children may be preferable to a life with children. Consider, for example,
Yale Law Professor Jed Rubenfeld's vision of parenting in his discussion of why the
right to privacy should invalidate laws that prohibit abortion:
To be sure, motherhood is no unitary phenomenon that is experienced alike by all
women. Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a state-enforced rule whose
ramifications within the actual, everyday life of the actor are more far-reaching
235. McAllister & Clarke, supra note 145, at 209, 223-224; see also J.E. VEEVERS,
CHILDLESS BY CHOICE 73-74 (1980) (reporting the importance of spontaneity for couples who
choose not to have children).
236. McAllister & Clarke, supra note 145, at 223.
237. Id. at 222.
238. GREER, supra note 18, at 3-4; see also MAY, supra note 109, at 16 (referring to
society's "collective hostility toward children"); David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other
Corporal Punishment of Children by Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35
Hous. L. REv. 147, 173-177 (1998) (discussing the many ways in which the law withholds
fundamental rights from children).
239. It may be that the high costs of weddings cause the wedding hosts to exclude children
from their invitation lists, reasoning that it is better to invite the adults of two families rather
than the adults and children of one family. But if cost were the issue, then the hosts could simply
provide a less expensive meal and include children. In Israel, it is common to have a more
formal meal for the inner circle of guests and a more modest buffet for a larger circle of guests.
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[than a ban on abortion]. For a period of months and quite possibly years, forced
motherhood shapes women's occupations and preoccupations in the minutest
detail; it creates a perceived identity for women and confines them to it; and it
gathers up a multiplicity of approaches to the problem of being a woman and
reduces them all to the single norm of motherhood.24
Thus it is difficult to imagine a single proscription with a greater capacity to shape
lives into singular, normalized, functional molds than the prohibition of abortions.
241
... Compelled child-bearing occupies a woman's life in the largest and subtlest
respects, puts her body to use in the most extreme and intrusive ways, and forces
upon her a well-defined.., role or identity.
242
Rubenfeld further indicates his view of parenting when he provides his basic
understanding of privacy rights:
The danger, then, is a particular kind of creeping totalitarianism, an unarmed
occupation of individuals' lives. That is the danger of which.., the right to
privacy is warning us: a society standardized and normalized, in which lives are
too substantially or too rigidly directed. That is the threat posed by state power in
our century.243
Rubenfeld's view of parenting-that it creates a "singular and normalized" society
and a life "rigidly directed"-is striking. Many people believe their lives have been
greatly enriched by their children and that parenting expands their options in life. As
one friend and single mother said to me, "My child gives me a purpose in life,
something that is lacking in the lives of my single friends who don't have children."
Oddly, Rubenfeld would consider it of greater constitutional concern if the state were
to ban abortion than if the state were to prohibit parents from having more than two
children.2 "
Rebecca Kukla, a professor of philosophy and obstetrics and gynecology who
specializes in bioethics, has argued against the use of experimental procedures to
preserve ovarian tissue from children before they undergo cancer treatment that might
render them infertile.245 In Kukla's view, ovarian tissue preservation is problematic
240. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. REv. 737, 788 (1989). Rubenfeld
seems to conflate a ban on abortion with a different kind of forced motherhood, one in which
the state would commandeer women to become pregnant and bear children. See id.
241. Id. at 791.
242. Id. at 796.
243. Id. at 784 (emphasis in original).
244. Id. at 796-97.
245. See Rebecca Kukla, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the Am. Soc'y of Bioethics
& Humanities: The Oncofertility Project: Ethics at the Intersection of Reproductive Medicine
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because such medical interventions may result in the girls being seen primarily in terms
of their reproductive capacity and "start [them] on the path to biological
motherhood.,246
Janice Raymond warns of the dangers oftechnological advances like IVF that allow
infertile women to have children. 247 Raymond writes, "[n]ew reproductive
arrangements are presented as a woman's private choice. But they are publicly
sanctioned violence against women." 4 Raymond also says this about IVF:
"Represented as expanding women's choices, IVF technology... actually narrows the
life choices of women who consume the technology.
' 249
The point is not that Rubenfeld, Kukla, and Raymond raise insignificant issues.
Rather, the concern is that they worry more about the consequences of encouraging
parenting than the consequences of discouraging parenting. For Rubenfeld, it is worse
to deny the option of abortion than to deny the option of procreation. 25 For Kukla, it is
more problematic to preserve a girl's future reproductive capacity than to let her
become infertile. 25 1 Raymond sees more danger to women in giving them the
opportunity to procreate when infertile than in withholding new reproductive
252
options.
And their views are influential. As prominent scholars, they play an important role
as opinion leaders in shaping public policy. Indeed, Rubenfeld's article is cited as
providing a leading argument for the right to privacy in major constitutional law
and Pediatric Care (Oct. 2008).
246. Id.
247. JANICE G. RAYMOND, WOMEN AS WOMBS: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
BATTLE OVER WOMEN'S FREEDOM (1993).
248. Id. at ix; see also Robyn Rowland, Of Women Born, but for How Long? The
Relationship of Women to the New Reproductive Technologies and the Issue of Choice, in
MADE TO ORDER: THE MYTH OF REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC PROGRESS 67, 77-80 (Patricia
Spallone & Deborah Lynn Steinberg eds., 1987) (expressing concern over the loss of choice for
women from IVF).
To be sure, Raymond raises some valid concerns about IVF and the extent to which it has
involved experimentation on women. Still, one could raise similar concerns about surgical
procedures to treat heart disease without referring to them as violence against men, who are the
predominant users of the technologies. In 2005, slightly more than sixty-nine percent of
coronary artery bypass surgery patients were men, and slightly more than sixty-nine percent of
patients who received coronary artery stents were men. AM. HEART ASS'N & AM. STROKE ASS'N,
HEART DISEASE AND STROKE STATISTICS: 2008 UPDATE AT-A-GLANCE 36 (2008), www.
americanheart.org/downloadable/heart/1200082005246HSStats%202008.final.pdf.
Raymond is not the only person to worry about the violence of IVF. In its first "Instruction"
on new reproductive technologies, the Catholic Church characterized IVF as a "dynamic of
violence and domination," albeit one against the embryos rather than the woman.
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION ON RESPECT FOR HuMAN LIFE IN
ITS ORIGIN AND ON THE DIGNITY OF PROCREATION: REPLIES TO CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF THE DAY
21 (1987). In a 2008 revised Instruction, the Vatican continued to condemn IVF but did not
repeat the dynamic of violence and domination language. CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF
THE FAITH, INSTRUCTION DIGNITAS PERSONAE ON CERTAIN BIOETHICAL QUESTIONS (2008).
249. RAYMOND, supra note 247, at 86.
250. See supra text accompanying note 240.
251. See supra text accompanying note 245.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
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casebooks,253 and it is one of the most frequently referenced among law review articles,
with more than 438 citations since it was published as the lead article in a 1989 issue of
the HarvardLaw Review.2 5 4 Clearly, the article and its reasoning resonate widely. By
way of comparison, Harvard Law Professor (and now Obama Administration
regulatory czar) Cass Sunstein's important article, The Anticaste Principle, in the
Michigan Law Review has been cited 161 times.255
All of this is not to suggest that infertility is never felt or perceived as disabling.
Indeed, studies have found that infertile persons often experience a sense of stigma
from their infertility.256 This stigma is particularly present for persons with cultural
backgrounds that highly value procreation.25 7 And there have been articles and books
in both popular and academic publications that praise assisted reproduction for infertile
persons. 25 Nevertheless, public attitudes have changed considerably in recent years to
the point that childlessness does not provoke the levels of social disadvantage that it
once did or that other disabilities currently do.
And the public attitudes have changed most for people of higher education and
greater wealth,259 arguably people with more influence in shaping public policy.
Indeed, past changes in attitude about family and procreation have been driven by a
253. PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALrIN, AKHIL REED AMAR & REVA B.
SIEGAL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 1480 (5th ed.
2006); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 422 (16th ed.
2007); STONE, ET AL., supra note 44, at 854.
254. Rubenfeld, supra note 240 (shepardized on LexisNexis for number of citations on
September 4, 2009).
255. Sunstein, supra note 3 (shepardized on LexisNexis for number of citations on
September 4,2009). An important HarvardLaw Review foreword by Judge Frank Easterbrook
of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit on the role of economic analysis in judicial
decision making has been cited only seven more times than Rubenfeld's, even though it was
published four and one-half years earlier. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983
Term: Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1984) (cited 445
times by law review articles). Harvard Law Professor Frederick Schauer's Easy Cases, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985), has been cited about 250 times. Some classic articles, like Robert
Cover's The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4
(1983), have been cited more than 1,000 times. See generally Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited
Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CH.-KENT L. REv. 751 (1996) (providing a list of frequently
cited law journal articles).
256. See, e.g., Charlene E. Miall, Perceptions of Informal Sanctioning and the Stigma of
Involuntary Childlessness, 6 DEVIANT BElAV. 383 (1985); Charlene E. Miall, The Stigma of
Involuntary Childlessness, 33 Soc. PROBS. 268,271-272 (1986); Diana C. Parry, Work, Leisure,
and Support Groups: An Examination of the Ways Women with Infertility Respond to
Pronatalist Ideology, 53 SEx RoLEs 337,342 (2005) (reporting on infertile women who felt that
they were "considered lacking, incomplete, or inadequate").
257. See Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, supra note 61.
258. See Chlo6 Diepenbrock, God Willed It! Gynecology at the Checkout Stand:
Reproductive Technology in the Women's Service Magazine, 1977-1996, in BODY TALK:
RHETORIC, TECHNOLOGY, REPRODUCTION 98 (Mary M. Lay et al. eds., 2000) (analyzing narrative
articles about assisted reproduction in women's magazines); JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE 29-42 (1994).
259. Cahn & Carbone, supra note 128, at 2.
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small part of the population. In the nineteenth century, the newly developing urban
middle class led the way in the decline of fertility rates.260
In sum, as infertility has evolved from a condition widely viewed as disabling to one
that is viewed by many as not disabling, and even enabling, the anticaste principle may
no longer provide protection for infertile persons from discrimination. As the next
section indicates, legal doctrine confirms this concern. Although some law does
recognize the disabling nature of infertility, infertile persons generally do not enjoy
much protection under the law. For the most part, public policy does not reflect the
view that infertility is a meaningful disability.
III. THE WEAK PROTECTION FOR INFERTILE PERSONS FROM
DISCRIMINATION IN CASE LAW
A. The Law's Recognition of Infertility as a Disability
The most important recognition of infertility as a disability came in surprising form
in Bragdon v. Abbott,261 the Supreme Court's first decision interpreting the ADA.2 62
While the case was not an obvious vehicle for deciding whether infertility meets the
ADA's definition of disability, the Court's decision turned on its holding that infertility
is a disability, at least in the context of that case.
Bragdon involved a claim of discrimination brought by Sidney Abbott, a woman
with an asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, who received
dental care from Randon Bragdon in 1994. 2 During his examination, Dr. Bragdon
discovered a dental cavity.264 Because of Ms. Abbott's HIV infection, which she had
disclosed on her patient registration form, Dr. Bragdon informed her that he would not
fill the cavity in his office but only in a hospital setting, in accordance with his
infection-control policy. 265 Under the policy, Ms. Abbott would have been responsible
for the costs of using the hospital's facilities.266 Ms. Abbott thereupon sued Dr.
Bragdon under the ADA.267
The case presented two key issues for the Supreme Court: (1) Did Ms. Abbott's
HIV infection meet the ADA's definition of disability even though she was not
experiencing any of the symptoms of an HIV infection? 268 (2) If Ms. Abbott was
disabled for purposes of the ADA, was Dr. Bragdon justified in implementing his
special infection-control policy to protect himself from becoming infected with
HIV?2
69
260. Id. at 10.
261. 524 U.S. 624 (1997).
262. The ADA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). The Court had previously
decided cases involving discrimination on the basis of disability under the Rehabilitation Act of
1973. See, e.g., Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
263. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 628-29.
264. Id. at 629.
265. Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 937 (1st Cir. 1997), vacated, 524 U.S. 624.
266. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 629.
267. Id.
268. 1d. at 628.
269. See id.
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For purposes of this Article, the important part of the opinion came in the Court's
answer to the question whether asymptomatic HIV infection constitutes a disability
under the ADA.270 Under the ADA, a disability is "a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more.., major life activities."271 Thus, the definition of
disability encompasses three key criteria: (1) a physical or mental impairment; (2) that
substantially limits; and (3) at least one major life activity. The Bragdon Court
concluded first that HIV infection is a physical impairment;27 2 it then decided that an
HIV infection substantially limits the major life activity of reproduction.273
The Court observed that HIV infection is a physical impairment from the moment of
infection because the virus immediately invades different cells in the body, causes
damage in those cells, particularly white blood cells, and over time results in serious
symptoms, including pneumonias, malignancies, and eventually death. 74 In short,
wrote the Court, "HIV infection must be regarded as a physiological disorder with a
constant and detrimental effect on the infected person[] .... HIV infection satisfies the
statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment during every stage of the
disease.
275
The question whether Ms. Abbott's HIV infection substantially limited a major life
activity was a little trickier for the Court. Ms. Abbott's HIV infection had not
progressed to Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS).2 76 In fact, it had not
resulted in any of the symptoms that characterize HIV disease, whether fever, nausea,
diarrhea, pneumonia, Kaposi's sarcoma, lymphoma, or other symptoms.2 77 In the
absence of any physical symptoms from her infection, how could it be said that the
infection was substantially limiting a major life activity, like speaking, learning,
walking, or working?
Ms. Abbott avoided this difficulty by claiming that her infection limited the major
life activity of reproduction. 278 The Court agreed.2 79 The Court noted that major life
activities are those that are of significant importance to the individual and that
"[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life activity.' Reproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself."
280
270. On the second question regarding Dr. Bragdon's justification for his infection-control
policy, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 655. On remand, the court of
appeals concluded that Dr. Bragdon had not offered evidence sufficient to overcome a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of whether he was justified in refusing to fill Ms. Abbott's
cavity in his office. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1 st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1121
(1999). The court found that the universal precautions recommended by the United States
Centers for Disease Control and the American Dental Association to prevent transmission of
HIV from patient to dentist (or other health-care provider) were sufficient to protect Dr.
Bragdon from risk to his own health. Id. at 89-90.
271. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
272. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 636-37.
273. Id. at 641.
274. Id. at 636-37.
275. Id. at 637.
276. Id. at 628.
277. Id. at 628, 636.
278. Id. at 637-38.
279. Id. at 638.
280. Id.
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Moreover, the Court found that H1V infection substantially limits a person's ability
to reproduce.28' If a woman infected with HIV engaged in sexual intercourse with a
male partner in order to procreate, he would face a significant risk of infection--twenty
percent, according to data cited by the Court.2 82 Their child would also be at risk of
infection-twenty-five percent of babies born to an HIV-infected mother also became
infected with HIV if the mother went without treatment.283 Even with treatment to
prevent HIV transmission, a child faced an eight percent risk of infection.2 4 While
these risks don't make reproduction impossible, wrote the Court, they do make it
"dangerous to the public health," which is sufficient to satisfy the demands of the
substantial limitation requirement. 85
Under Bragdon, then, infertile persons would appear to enjoy protection from
denials of health care under the ADA. To an important extent, infertile persons do have
this protection. If a doctor refused to provide dialysis or remove an inflamed appendix
because of the patient's infertility, the patient could seek redress under the ADA, just
as Sidney Abbott did when her dentist refused to fill her cavity in his dental office.
But the primary discrimination that infertile persons face in the health-care system
does not involve denials of treatment for kidney disease, heart disease, or cancer.
Rather, as discussed above, the infertile generally cannot obtain coverage for the costs
of medical treatments that allow them to overcome their infertility and reproduce-
unlike persons with other disabling conditions like heart disease, arthritis, emphysema,
or paraplegia who enjoy recourse to health-care insurance when they need medical
services. Most health-care plans will not reimburse patients or physicians for the costs
of IVF or other technologies to assist reproduction, and even when insurance provides
coverage, it typically is inadequate.286 For the most part, infertile persons are uninsured
for the costs of having children, and, as the next section indicates, the ADA offers no
help in remedying this differential treatment by health-care insurers.287
B. The Failure to Recognize Infertility as a Disability Under the Law
Although Bragdon held that infertility is a disability under the ADA, lower courts
have held that insurers do not violate the ADA when they fail to cover the costs of IVF
281. Id. at 639.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 640.
284. Id. at 639-40.
285. Id. at 641. Since the Court's decision, the risk of transmission from mother to child has
dropped to less than one percent if transmission-prevention treatments are followed. COMM. ON
PEDIATRIC AIDS, AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, HIV Testing and Prophylaxis to Prevent Mother-
to-Child Transmission in the United States, 122 PEDIATRICS 1127, 1129 (2008).
286. Daar, supra note 90, at 36; see also supra Part II.D.1.
287. An infertile person might be protected from discrimination by an employer who fires
the person for missing time from work while seeking medical treatment for the infertility. See
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiff stated a cognizable claim
for sex discrimination when she alleged that she had been fired for taking time off from work to
undergo IVF); LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758 (W.D. Mich. 2001)
(holding that plaintiff stated a viable claim under the ADA and analogous state laws when she
alleged that she had been fired for working a restricted schedule while undergoing IVF).
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or other treatments for infertility. 288 According to the courts, there is no discrimination
on the basis of disability since coverage is denied for all persons, not just for persons
who are disabled.289
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co. 29 0 illustrates this point well. In that case, Rochelle Saks
received health insurance benefits through her employer, the Franklin Covey
Company.29' Because of infertility, Ms. Saks underwent numerous tests and tried
various drugs and procedures to become pregnant, including intrauterine insemination
(IUI) and IVF.292 When Franklin Covey refused to cover the costs of her infertility
care, Ms. Saks sued under the ADA to recover those costs, 293 but the district court
found no ADA violation. 294 The court observed:
Franklin Covey's plan offers the same insurance coverage to all its employees. It
does not offer infertile people less pregnancy and fertility-related coverage than it
offers to fertile people. Therefore, as a matter of law, the Plan does not violate the
ADA. In EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank,... the Court of Appeals [for the
Second Circuit], joining the Third, Seventh and Eighth Circuits, held that
insurance distinctions that apply equally to all insured employees do not
discriminate on the basis of disability.
295
Although the Saks court gives the impression that its hands were tied and that it
could not find discrimination under the ADA, the law was uncertain enough that the
court could have found discrimination on the basis of disability. The case law cited by
the court involved cases in which insurance plans provided higher coverage for some
disabilities than for other disabilities. In EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank,296
288. See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
289. There have been cases in which an infertile person successfully challenged a denial of
coverage for treatment, but those cases involve claims that the insurer has in fact promised to
provide coverage. See, e.g., Egert v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that insurer viewed infertility as an illness, that it had committed to covering necessary
treatment for illness, and that IVF was a necessary treatment for the plaintiff's infertility under
the terms of the insurance contract).
290. 117 F. Supp. 2d 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
291. Id. at 320.
292. Id.
293. Ms. Saks also brought claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act but was unsuccessful with those claims as well. Saks v. Franklin
Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003). Those claims failed, said the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, because an insurer's denial of coverage for IVF and other infertility treatments
disadvantage both the female and male members of the couple. Id at 345-49. For a discussion
of the current failure of these antidiscrimination statutes to protect infertile persons and
observations for how antidiscrimination claims might succeed in the future, see Pendo, supra
note 14, at 317-25; Brietta R. Clark, Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.: A Roadmapfor Gender
Equality in Reproductive Health Care or an Empty Promise?, 23 LAW & INEQ. 299 (2005);
Katherine E. Abel, Note, The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for
Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union, 37 CONN. L. REv. 819 (2005).
294. Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
295. Id. at 326-27 (discussing EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank, 207 F.3d 144 (2d Cir.
2000)).
296. 207 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2000).
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mentioned by the Saks court, the insurers provided more generous long-term disability
insurance coverage for physical disabilities like cancer or heart disease than for mental
disabilities like depression or schizophrenia. 297 For all disabilities, benefits were
available for persons who became disabled before the age of sixty, and benefits would
cease when the person reached age sixty-five.298 While persons with physical
disabilities faced no other limits on the duration of their benefits, persons with mental
disabilities could receive benefits for no more than eighteen or twenty-four months.299
But the Supreme Court had earlier drawn a distinction under disability law between
providing no coverage and a meaningful level of coverage. In Alexander v. Choate,300
the Court upheld Tennessee's cap on hospital coverage of fourteen days per year, even
though it disfavored persons with disabilities, on the ground that the disabled still had
meaningful access to hospital coverage. 30 The Saks court could have distinguished the
differential treatment of fertile and infertile persons in its case from the differential
treatment of mental and physical disabilities in Staten Island on the ground that
persons with mental disabilities still had meaningful access to long-term disability
coverage in Staten Island, while infertile persons employed at Franklin Covey had no
access to treatment for their infertility.
The Saks court also cited the insurance provisions of the ADA to reject Ms. Saks's
disabilities discrimination claim. 30 2 According to those provisions, the ADA does not
limit the ability of an employer to establish and administer its own health-care plan that
is exempt from state regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). 30 3 Because Franklin Covey ran a self-insured health-care plan, it was
exempt from state regulation under ERISA and therefore also not subject to the dictates
of the ADA.3°4
Even if Franklin Covey had not self-insured its employees, its health insurance plan
would have enjoyed an exemption from the ADA under the insurance provisions.
Those provisions allow health insurers to employ their usual practices of classifying
risks, as long as the practices are actuarially sound. 30 5 The ADA withdraws the
297. Id. at 146-47.
298. Id.
299. Id. (describing two plans, one with an eighteen-month limit and the other with a twenty-
four-month limit).
300. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
301. Id. at 301. The fourteen-day cap disfavored persons with disabilities since they were
more likely to require more than fourteen days of hospital care in a given year. Id. at 289-90.
302. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 327-28 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
303. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(3) (2006). Under ERISA, private-employee benefit plans are
subject to a uniform regulatory structure administered by the federal government. Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004). The Act also preempts many state-benefit-plan
regulations, including regulation of health-care plans. HALL ET AL., supra note 204, at 1031-
1032. The application of ERISA to health-care plans is complicated and beyond the scope of
this Article. Suffice it to say that it has proved controversial-a statute designed to protect the
interests of employees has often served to compromise their interests with respect to health-care
coverage. Linda P. McKenzie, Eligibility, Treatment, or Something In-Between? Plaintiffs Get
Creative to Get Past ERISA Preemption, 23 J. CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 272, 275-276
(2007).
304. Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 327-28.
305. § 12201(c)(1).
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protection of the insurance provisions when they are used as a subterfuge to escape the
requirements of the Act, but Franklin Covey's exclusion of coverage for IUI and IVF
preceded the enactment of the ADA.3"
In sum, although infertile persons experience widespread discrimination when it
comes to access to medical care for their infertility, they cannot turn to
antidiscrimination law for protection.
C. Infertile Persons Are Wrongly Deprived of the Protection of the
Americans with Disabilities Act
Some scholars have suggested that it may be appropriate for courts to deny claims
of discrimination by infertile persons and that the infertile should not have recourse to
the courts to protect themselves from discrimination in access to medical care for their
infertility. In this view, it is not a problem that the anticaste principle fails to reach the
infertile. Rather, principles of judicial review explain why antidiscrimination law
should be reserved for persons who belong to a stigmatized class.
To be sure, the judicial review argument is a constitutional argument and need not
carry over to the setting of statutory protections against discrimination. Indeed,
statutory protections like the ADA are designed to fill in the gaps of constitutional
protections. Still, one might invoke the judicial review argument in the setting of
statutory protections against discrimination.
30 7
The judicial review argument draws on the work of John Hart Ely and his important
procedural theory of judicial authority. 30 8 In this view, our constitutional structure
relies primarily on the political process to resolve disputes and allocate benefits and
burdens, with majority preferences being decisive. 309 If courts were to intervene,
judges would be substituting their own preferences for those of the majority, and that
normally would entail an improper exercise ofjudicial power.310 But sometimes, the
political process operates in an unfair manner.3 ' In particular, when the interests of a
stigmatized minority are at stake, the majority is likely to disfavor the minority out of
prejudice or other illegitimate motives and fail to give due recognition to the minority's
interests. 312 In such circumstances, courts should intervene. Judges ought to thwart the
majority on behalf of a minority when the political process does not treat the minority
fairly.313 On the other hand, when the political process gives a particular group a fair
chance to advocate for its interests, then the group is not entitled to a judicial rescue
simply because it lost in the political process.
Under this view of the role of courts, write Carl Coleman and Radhika Rao, the
infertile do not qualify for judicial protection because they enjoy sufficient influence in
306. Saks, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 328.
307. Recall the earlier discussion about the role of the anticaste principle in understanding
both the Equal Protection Clause and the ADA. See supra Part 1.
308. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVEw (1980).
309. Id. at 7, 87.
310. Id. at 102.
311. Id. at 103.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 102-03.
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the political process.3 14 People using IVF and other treatments are disproportionately
white and wealthy, and they are able to mobilize the support of other influential interest
groups, like the medical community and the pharmaceutical industry, to avoid unfair
treatment by legislatures.3t 5
While initially appealing, the judicial review argument ultimately fails. As Rao
recognizes, infertility crosses racial and economic lines.3 16 In fact, blacks and other
minorities are more likely than whites, and the poor are more likely than the wealthy, to
be infertile. 3 17 Moreover, while Coleman and Rao observe that the users of infertility
treatments are overwhelmingly white and wealthy, that simply reflects the fact that
discrimination against the infertile has its biggest impact on minority and poor persons.
As a number of scholars have argued, this disparate impact may be intentional-the
denial of insurance coverage for infertility treatments may reflect a social sentiment
against reproduction by blacks, the poor, and other disfavored minorities. In other
words, eugenic motivations likely play an important role in shaping public policy on
treatment for infertility, as they have historically. 3 8 Reproductive policies in the
United States have long favored procreation by whites and wealthier persons and
disfavored procreation by minorities and poor individuals.319 When health-care
insurance does not cover infertility treatments and couples (or individuals) must pay
out of pocket, then the significant costs of these treatments mean that they tend to be
reserved for wealthier, white couples who can pay for them out of personal resources.
Costs are not the only factor in explaining higher use of infertility treatments by
whites. Minorities often feel more stigmatized by their infertility and may be less
willing to identify themselves as infertile and seek treatment for it, minorities are more
likely to distrust the health-care system because of past racist experiences, and white
physicians may be less likely to recommend assisted reproductive technologies for
infertile black patients.320 Nevertheless, the financial barriers are important and a useful
strategy for limiting access to care.
Most fundamentally, the judicial review argument is not persuasive because it does
not account for discrimination on the basis of dismissiveness. When there is
dismissiveness-based discrimination, one would expect a failure of the political
process. Just as stigmatized individuals do not receive fair consideration oftheir needs
in the political process, so are dismissed individuals denied fair consideration of their
needs.
314. Coleman, supra note 193, at 68-69; Rao, supra note 193, at 1478.
315. Coleman, supra note 193, at 68-69; Rao, supra note 193, at 1478.
316. Rao, supra note 193, at 1478.
317. Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and
Infertility: Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 FERTILITY & STERILrrY 844, 845
(2006).
318. Id.; see also Daar, supra note 90, at 40, 80-81; Deborah L. Steinberg, A Most Selective
Practice: The Eugenic Logics ofIVF, 20 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 33 (1997).
319. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1436-50 (1991) (discussing
the history of public policies in the United States that devalued black motherhood).
320. Daar, supra note 90, at 38-43; Inborn & Fakih, supra note 317, at 845-47; Dorothy E.
Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 937-42 (1996).
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D. Costs of Infertility Treatment Do Not Explain the Poor Insurance Coverage
Can one defend the absence of coverage for IVF or other treatments by pointing to
costs and benefits? Some critics have cited high costs and poor results of IVF.32 1 While
it is true that (1) an average IVF cycle costs between $10,000 and $15,000,322 (2) many
couples will need multiple cycles of IVF before they give birth to a child,323 and (3)
many other couples will never reproduce with IVF,324 the costs and benefits actually
seem quite reasonable. Although success rates have not been high in the past,325 they
have improved considerably. According to the most recent national report, using 2006
data, a live birth resulted from 28.6% of IVF cycles using fresh embryos.326 If each
cycle costs between $10,000 and $15,000, and 28.6% of cycles are successful, then it
costs between $35,000 and $52,500 for each live birth from IVF.327
To put that figure in perspective, consider the use of the quality-adjusted life year
(QALY) 328 to measure the cost effectiveness of health care. The QALY approach takes
into account improvements in both length of life and quality of life.32 9 For example,
one QALY equals an additional year of life at 100% quality (1 x 1.00). One QALY
also results from an increase in the quality of life from 80% to 90% that lasts for ten
years ((0.90-0.80) x 10).330 While researchers often consider health care cost effective
321. Neumann, supra note 201, at 1219 (referencing argument made by others).
322. David S. Guzick, Editorial, Should Insurance Coverage for In Vitro Fertilization Be
Mandated?, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 686, 687 (2002); see also Cost of IVF at the Advanced
Fertility Ctr. of Chi.: High Quality, Low Cost IVF, http://www.advancedfertility.com/ivfprice
.htm; Mark Perloe, Duration, Cost of IVF Treatment, YOUR TOTAL HEALTH, http://
yourtotalhealth.ivillage.com/duration-cost-ivf-treatment.html.
323. Beth A. Malizia, Michele R. Hacker & Alan S. Penzias, Cumulative Live-Birth Rates
After In Vitro Fertilization, 360 NEw ENG. J. MED. 236, 237 (2009).
324. Id. at 240 (finding that at least twenty-eight percent of women who undergo IVF will
not give birth to a child via IVF).
325. RAYMOND, supra note 247, at 9-11 (reporting live birth rates below ten percent from
IVF).
326. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS 19 (2008),
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf [hereinafter, CDC, 2006 ART
REPORT]. "Fresh" embryos are distinguished from cycles in which the embryos have been frozen
and thawed before transfer to the woman's uterus. Success rates with frozen, nondonor embryos
are lower than with fresh embryos. Id. at 54.
The likelihood of success is much higher for a woman younger than thirty-five years of age
than for a woman who is forty or older. With fresh embryos, thirty-nine percent of women
younger than thirty-five have a live birth from an IVF cycle, while only eleven percent of
women who are forty-one or forty-two and four percent of women older than forty-two have a
live birth. Id. at 30.
327. If each cycle costs $10,000 to $15,000, then 100 cycles will cost $1 million to $1.5
million. Of those 100 cycles, 28.6 will result in a live birth. Thus, the cost of a successful cycle
is $1 million to $1.5 million divided by 28.6, or $35,000-$52,500.
328. QALY is pronounced like "kwallee."
329. See David C. Hadom, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality ofLife and Public
Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, 11, 13.
330. Id. at 13. QALYs are a widely used measure in health care. The United Kingdom, for
example, uses QALYs as its measure of cost effectiveness in deciding whether to provide
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when it can provide one QALY for less than $50,000, some experts deem medical care
cost effective up to $100,000 for an extra year of life, and data suggest that the public
may support even higher costs per QALY.3 3 Thus, if a live birth from IVF were to
produce at least one QALY, it would be deemed cost effective according to current
views.
There are two ways in which reproduction produces additional years of high-quality
life. First, for the parents, there will be an increase in their quality of life. 332 If
reproduction restores an infertile woman's mental health, then for many years
thereafter, her quality of life will be higher. Second, reproduction produces additional
QALYs through the lives of the children it creates. One could say that the birth of a
healthy child yields one QALY for every year of the child's life as long as the child
remains healthy, and less than one QALY for each year in which the child is ill or
injured.333
Data from Massachusetts also indicate that 1VF coverage is an affordable
component of health-care insurance policies.334 In 1987, Massachusetts enacted its
mandate for coverage of infertility services, including IVF.335 Researchers who
examined the impact of the mandate on insurance premiums through 1993 found that
the costs of coverage for infertility services accounted for no more than about four-
tenths of a percent of total expenditures for health care by insurers in the state.336
Experience in other countries illustrates the affordability of coverage for IVF. France
provides full coverage for IVF,337 and Israel has also shown that IVF can be covered
with a much smaller budget for health care.338 In Israel, the national health service
covers IVF (and other assisted reproductive services) for all women up to age forty-
coverage for a new treatment as part of its national healthcare plan. Michael D. Rawlins &
Anthony J. Culyer, National Institute for Clinical Excellence and Its Value Judgments, 329
BRIT. MED. J. 224, 224 (2004). That said, their use provokes some controversy. In particular, it
is difficult to assign numerical measures to a person's quality of life. Hadom, supra note 329, at
13-16. Also, QALYs can disfavor persons with disabilities. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Care
Rationing and Disability Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 491, 500-05 (1995).
331. See Richard A. Hirth, Michael E. Chemew, Edward Miller, Mark Fendrick & William
G. Weissert, Willingness to Pay for a Quality-Adjusted Life Year: In Search of a Standard, 20
MED. DECISION MAKING 332, 333, 339-40 (2000).
332. Recall the high levels of depression in infertile women. See supra Part II.A.
333. To be sure, this second claim is more controversial since the new child's life does not
exist when the costs of IVF are incurred. Moreover, for someone who believes that the world is
overpopulated, more children have a negative social value. Nevertheless, society cannot exist
without procreation, and that demonstrates a positive social value for children. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very
existence and survival of the race.").
334. Martha Griffin & William F. Panak, The Economic Cost oflnfertility-Related Services:
An Examination of the Massachusetts Infertility Insurance Mandate, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY
22 (1998).
335. Id. at 23.
336. Id. at 27.
337. L. Garceau, J. Henderson, L.J. Davis, S. Petrou, L.R. Henderson, E. McVeigh, D.H.
Barlow & L.L. Davidson, Economic Implications of Assisted Reproductive Techniques: A
Systematic Review, 17 HuM. REPROD. 3090, 3090 (2002).
338. See Birenbaum-Carmeli & Dirnfeld, supra note 171.
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five, until a woman has had two children with her current partner.339 Moreover, the two
children limit is not strictly applied in practice, and women can still receive substantial
funding for treatment to have more than two children. 340 Israeli women also enjoy
generous child support payments and maternity leave benefits.
34 1
Coverage for mental health needs also illustrates the weakness of the cost argument.
In response to insurers limiting coverage for mental health care and courts upholding
the limits, Congress enacted legislation in 1996 and again in 2008 to achieve coverage
for mental illness equal to coverage for physical illness. 342 As discussed, legislative
efforts have been much less successful at ensuring coverage for infertility. Fewer than a
third of states have enacted some legislation for infertility coverage,3 43 and Congress
has not enacted any legislation requiring such coverage. Moreover, the coverage for
mental illness is more generous than coverage for infertility even though mental health-
care costs much more than treatment for infertility. Care for mental health needs
consumes about four percent of the private health-care insurance premium,344 or ten
times the cost of infertility coverage in Massachusetts after private insurers were
required to cover infertility treatment. 345 Note too that while mental health coverage
has been inadequate, there at least has been partial coverage. For infertility treatment,
there typically is no coverage.
Upon close examination, then, the claims that infertility treatments cost too much
money are not persuasive. The existence of such claims, however, is consistent with a
theory of dismissiveness. If society does not believe that childlessness is a significant
disability, then it will not support even modest expenditures to foster procreation
among the infertile. Indeed, this is the whole point of a cost argument. The cost
argument essentially boils down to the sentiment that helping people have children is
not valued. As a result, infertile persons suffer discrimination when it comes to having
their health-care needs met. Or to put it another way, the cost argument reflects the
devaluation of parenting. And, as discussed, economic and other considerations have
339. Id. at 182-83.
340. Id. at 184.
341. Id. at 183. While Israel provides ample financial assistance to women who want
children, the national health service does less to help women who don't want children. For
contraceptive services or abortion, only partial health coverage is available; abortion also
requires a committee's approval. Id. For more information about the abortion committee
process, see Delila Amir & Orly Biniamin, Abortion Approval as a Ritual of Symbolic Control,
3 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 5 (1992).
342. Robert Pear, Bailout Provides More Mental Health Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/06/washington/06mental.html. Earlier parity legislation,
the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, included loopholes that prevented full parity. John V.
Jacobi, Parity and Difference: The Value of Parity Legislation for the Seriously Mentally 111, 29
AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 192-93 (2003). While the 1996 Act required equal annual and lifetime
caps on coverage for mental and physical illness, it did not prevent insurers from imposing other
disparities in coverage, like higher co-payments for mental health services or caps on the
number of visits to a physician during a particular month or year. Id.
343. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text.
344. Tami L. Mark, Katharine R. Levit, Jeffrey A. Buck, Rosanna M. Coffey & Rita
Vandivort-Warren, Mental Health Treatment Expenditure Trends, 1986-2003, 58 PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES 1041, 1043 (2007).
345. See Griffin & Panak, supra note 334.
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led people to view childlessness as much more desirable than it was viewed in previous
generations.34 6 That being the case, it is not surprising that society would deem
coverage for infertility treatments undesirable.
E. Does Discrimination Against the Infertile Reflect Forms of Invidious Bias?
Although discrimination on the basis of dismissiveness appears to be the major
basis for discrimination against the infertile, it probably is not the exclusive basis.
There may be an element of bias against infertile couples on the ground that they could
have had children when they were younger and that therefore they are responsible for
their predicament.34 7 This would be analogous to the stigma that lung cancer patients
face from others who blame the patients for having brought on their disease by
smoking cigarettes.
348
Still, while blaming the infertile may be an element of the discrimination against
them, it likely is a smaller part than the discrimination from dismissiveness. Many
infertile persons cannot conceive because of problems unrelated to their age. For
example, many women are infertile because of scarring from a ruptured appendix, a
pelvic infection, or endometriosis. 349 In addition, most users of lVF are thirty-five
years or younger, and more than eighty percent are forty years of age or younger.350 If
couples are being blamed for their infertility, one would expect such blame to be
reserved for couples over age forty. Also, studies of infertile persons do not find that
expressions of blame from others are prominent. 5' Finally, if denial of coverage were
driven primarily by bias against couples that have delayed childbearing, then we would
expect to see IVF covered until a specific age cutoff (whether thirty-five, forty, or
another age), just as Israel covers infertility treatments only until a woman reaches age
forty-five.
35 2
CONCLUSION
The anticaste principle generally serves as a powerful explanatory tool in
understanding discrimination, and at one time, it did so for discrimination on the basis
of infertility. However, as infertility is seen less as a disabling condition, and more as a
condition that can protect against disability, the anticaste principle falls short as an
antidiscrimination theory. As the example of infertility illustrates, discrimination can
result when people dismiss the idea that a condition is disabling, and public policy
therefore fails to provide adequate services to overcome the disability.
Infertility is not the only disabling condition that elicits attitudes ofdismissiveness.
Individuals disabled by chronic fatigue syndrome often have found that doctors and lay
346. See supra Part II.C.
347. GREmL, supra note 187, at 127.
348. Alison Chapple, Sue Ziebland & Ann McPherson, Stigma, Shame, and Blame
Experienced by Patients with Lung Cancer: Qualitative Study, 328 BRrr. MED. J. 1470 (2004).
349. See supra Part II.A.
350. CDC, 2006 ART REPORT, supra note 326, at 25.
351. See supra Part I1.D.1.
352. Birenbaum-Carneli & Dirnfeld, supra note 171, at 183.
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persons are dismissive of their complaints,353 and individuals whose functioning is
hampered by depression may be told to stop whining and pull themselves together.354
Currently, antidiscrimination law does not provide adequate protection against
discrimination on the basis of dismissiveness. The failure ofantidiscrimination theory
to give adequate recognition to the possibility of such discrimination is an important
part of the problem. While doctrine does not always track theory, it is difficult to
expect doctrine to reject practices that are not viewed as problematic from a
perspective of underlying theory.
It is therefore important that antidiscrimination theory be developed in a way that
reaches all important forms of discrimination. Recognizing the discrimination that
comes out of dismissiveness can ensure that the legal system has more comprehensive
antidiscrimination theory and doctrine, both under the Equal Protection Clause and
statutes like the Americans with Disabilities Act.
353. Thomas H. Maugh, II, Chronic Fatigue Is in the Genes, Study Finds, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2006, at Al.
354. These examples of dismissiveness are somewhat different from the example of
infertility. With infertility, the impact of the condition on the infertile person is recognized by
others but not viewed as truly disabling. With chronic fatigue syndrome and depression, others
do not acknowledge the impact of the condition on the person suffering from it.
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